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Containerization  and multimodal transport  *  Develop  and manage efficient subsystems
arrangements  are key features of the radical re-  for shipping,  railway, road, and air transport
structuring  of transport  logistics in international  sectors as well as port and warehouse  systems.
trade in recent years.
- Lift import duties on vital equipment  and
To increase trade, India must tie into this  spares.
highly organized intemational  trade logistics
network  - but it has been totally  unprepared  to  *  Revise  the regulatory and control net that
cope with the demanding arrangements  common  now strangles  transport. Above all, simplify
among  its major trade partners. Peters recom-  customs procedures.
mends the following agenda for reform:
- Adapt trade-related  banking  and insurance
* Prepare a strategy for tying into intema-  arrangements.
tional trade and transport logistics,  particularly
through containerization. This means  organiz-  * Promote  the national freight forwarding  in-
ing India's fragmented  systems planning,  dustry by relaxing regulations  that govem it.
control, and management, and involving  the pri-
vate sector in organizing logistics  networks.  * Encourage  the participation  of the private
sector,  particularly  through equipment  leasing
- Create a joint public-private  sector task  and privatization  of such facility operations  as
force to establish an agenda for market surveys  container  terrninals.
and system analyses to identify system short-
comings and needs.
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Note: The term 'Logistics' is used in this report in a very general sense
to denote all systematic actions aimed at bringing materials from primary
sources through all  intermediate  steps  to  the  end  user. It includes
transportation,  packaging,  handling,  storage,  inventory  control, and
related information processes, as well as banking and insurance services.
In popular terms, logistics is often  referred to as the art of 'bringing
the right amount of the right  material  to  the right place in the right
time and at the right costs'.
This analysis was  greatly  facilitated  through  contributions by a wide
variety  of Indian public and private sector institutions and individuals,
which  is  gratefully  acknowledged.  The  author  wishes  to thank Philip
Blackshaw,  Jeffrey  Gutman,  Kasturi  Luthra,  Jayant  Shakdher, Stephen
Talbot and Sir Alan  Walters  for  helpful  conments while  this paper was
drafted.I.  SUMMARY
(I)  India has been  a  rather  marginal  participant  In  world trade
durIng the early  years  after  independence.  The  need to consolidate a
large and  populous  economy,  to  achieve  self-sufficiency,  and Import
substitution policies account for much  of  the reasons for the country's
inward-looking orientation of the  past.  Until recently, Indian economic
policy has not treated exports as  a  prlority  but  in  the last few years
there  has  been  a  growing  awareness  of  the  importance  of  export
performance, as the limits  of efficient import substitution were reached.
The oil shocks created  severe  adjustment  pressures  for the balance of
payments, and the benefits  of  having  foreign  exchange to finance more
rapid Importation of high technology  capital goods In scarce supply have
become more recognized.
(ii)  Since 1980,  the  structure  and  orientation  of  Indian  export
trades have undergone fundamental  changes. Substantlal progress was made
In diversifying  the export  base  -manufactured  goods have  increased and
the traditional bulk sector  has  shrunk.  Key  targets for the export of
manufactured  goods are the European, Japanese and North American markets.
These markets are characterized by Increasingly efficient trade  logistics
arrangements -a trend that was  spurred  by the shippers' drive to reduce
Inventory  costs,  and  by  the  International  carriers  who  initiated
significant service restructuring  In  order  to better meet the shippers'
more and more sophisticated  logistics requirements. Containerization  and
multi-modal  transport arrangements were central to these developments.
(iil)  To enable further trade growth,  India  Is  now confronted with a
need to  tie  into  the  highly  organized  international trade logistics
networks. But  the  country  was  totally  unprepared  to  cope  with the
demanding  logistics arrangements, common  among  Its  major trade partners.
National  planners  considered  containerization  as  a  state-of-the art
development which would  happen  only  very  slowly  in Indla, and  lIttle
action was taken to  prepare  the  national  economy  for the events that
finally have affected  Indian trade In a  major way. As  a result, there is
a real danger  that  India's  trade  performance  will deteriorate,  If  no
corrective measures are taken.- 2 -
(Iv)  A  highly  fragmented  service  Industry,  outdated regulations,
heavy Government  control,  a  constrained  private  sector,  and largely
Inadequate  Infrastructure  have  curtailed  efforts  to  Improve  trade
logistics arrangements  in India.  Major reforms  are called for so that an
effective framework for  initiating  urgently required system adjustments
can be estabflshed.  In  particular  the  pubilc corporations, mandated to
provide  logistics services, have to be substantially reorganized, and the
Government's  protective  umbrella  has  to  be  lifted  so  that  these
corporations can become more  market  responsive  In  competition wlth the
private service  Industries.  The  role  and  participation of the private
sector  should  be  substantially  enhanced  because  the  few successful
service  Innovations In India  were brought about by private companies.
(v)  There are plans to Invest about US$ 3 billion each year over the
next decade  In trade logistics  facilities.  However,  In the absence of a
national strategy for efficient organization of trade logistics In India,
proposed investments In the service  sector often bear  little relation to
system  Improvement needs. This fact Is compounded by common situations  in
which  existing  facilities  are  not  utilized  to  their  full capacity
potential  because  of  Ineffectual  management  and  cumbersome  control
procedures. The  country  needs  a  harmonized  national  trade logistics
management and development strategy, and  its formulation should be given
highest priority . Under  such  strategy,  each  segment of the logistics
system  should  be  assigned  a  proper  role  and  function  -based  on
consideratlons of cost-effectiveness and market response.
(vI)  Very  importantly, the entire  setup of the public administration
for managing the national  trade  logistics  system has to be reassessed.
The present organizational  arrangements  are  excessive which undermines
efforts to improve  the  system's  responsiveness  to  changing trade and
transport market environments.  It  will  be  vital to Include the private
sector  In these deliberations. Possibly  the most cumbersome task will be
the absolute need to  revise  the  regulatory  framework that governs the
conduct of trade logistics services. Going by  the experience with  similar
efforts  In  other countries,  It  should be recognized that  Instituting the
required system adjustments will  be  a  major task for which unequivocal
Government  commitment  is  a  basic  prerequisite.  Invariably, the process
will spread over several years -but  it is Important to get  it  started!- 3 -
II.  NATIONAL  TRADE  DEVELOPMENT
1.  Since independence, India has been a rather marginal participant
in world trade, as shown below.
Growth of Indian Import and Export Trades
1950  1986  Compound Growth Rate
US$  share  US$  share  1950-1986
(bn)  (Z)  (bn)  (Z)  (Z)
World Exports  60.7  100  2,113.6  100  11.5
India Exports  1.2  1.9  9.2  0.4  7.0
World Imports  63.6  100  2,213.1  100  11.5
India Imports  1.2  1.8  14.8  0.7  7.4
(Note: exports on f.o.b. and imports on c.i.f. basis)
Source:  UNCTAD  Handbook  on International  Trade  and Development  Statistics,  1987.
2.  The above figures  demonstrate  that  India's  foreign trade has
grown at a much slower pace  than  world trade. Actually, both export and
import trades as a proportion  of  global  trade have been shrinking. The
1986 share of Indian exports  in  world  trade  was only one fifth of the
corresponding figure in 1950. As  an explanation: markets for commodities
which  have  traditionally  formed  the  backbone  of  Indian  exports
-essentially the bulk trades-  have  displayed very modest growth trends.
But over the last few  years,  the  structure  of Indian exports has been
changing. The share of manufactured  goods  in the total export structure
is increasing, whereas the bulk  trades  show declining trends; see table
below.
Structure of India's Export Trade
Commodity Group  Percent Share
1970  1980  1986
Manufactured  goods  45.1  57.5  64.6
All food items  29.7  28.2  22.5
Agricultural  raw materials  5.6  4.0  3.8
Fuels and Combustibles  0.8  0.4  0.4
Ores and metals  18.5  8.6  7.9
Unallocated  0.3  1.3  0.8
(Note: Comparisons are in terms of value.)
Source:  Department  of  Statistics,  Ministry  of  Planning,  GOI.3.  In general and until  recently,  Indian  economic policy has not
treated exports as  a  priority.  Instead,  the  aim  was for broad self-
sufficiency in most  products  through  import substitution, with exports
covering the costs of residual import requirements. In the last few years
there  has  been  a  growing  awareness  of  the  importance  of  export
performance as the limits of  efficient import substitution were reached.
The oil price increases of  1973/74 and 1979/80 created severe adjustmer.n
pressures for the balance of payments, and the benefits of having foreign
exchange to finance  more  rapid  importation  of high technology capital
goods and  consumer  goods  in  scarce  supply  have  become  more widely
recognized.
4.  Among the domestic industries  which  target the export markets,
the most important are the  eng neering -particularly electronics ar.d  car
manufacturing-  and the  textile  sectors.  The engineering indusiry has
become a large and  varied  component  of Indian manufacturing.  However,
the industry  is  afflicted  by  power  shortages, excessive regulations,
limited supplies of raw materials  and  lack of access to new techr.ology.
In the two sub-sectors electronics  and  motor vehicles major efforts are
under way to boost productivity  through liberalization of technology and
component imports, simplified licensing,  foreign  investment and cuts in
customs and excise duties.  In  the  wake  of  these developments, it is
interesting to observe how some segments of these industries have started
to tie into international production networks. The case can be made about
car manufacturing  and  consumer  electronics.1 After  significant value
added in India, products out of  these industries are then re-exported tc
overseas markets, particularly in Asia, the Middle East and Africa.  This
move became possible  after  substantial  production  capacities had been
established and domestic demand could be largely satisfied.
5.  The drive  to  increase  exports  of  manufactured  goods  is an
imoortant phenomenon  of  far-reaching  consequences  for trade logistics
management.  The same can be said about the changing market orientation of
India's export flows. Both observations will be further elaborated below.
Orientation of India's Export Trades in key Markets
Region  Percent Share
1960  197C  1980  1988
Asia  12.2  24.5  2C.5  20.9
Australia  2.6  2.4  1.8  -1.
Europe  34.1  26.0  28.8  29.1
Middle East  27.5  6.1  10.8  5.8
U.S.A.  5.1  18.1  23.8  24.3
U.S.S.R.  18.5  22.8  14.4  18.8
Source:  Directorate  General  of Commercial  Intelligence,  Ministry  of Commerce,  GCI.
1/'  Two  examples  are  imports  of glass  for  cars  from  Indonesia  srd  television  tubes  from  South
Korea,  which represents  about  '25 Forty-foot  containers  that  a-e  moved  to  Northern  Indis  on
a  weekly  basis.- 5  -
In percentage terms, the trades  with  Africa and Latin America are still
negligible. However, indications are that much growth will occur in these
international market segments over the next few years.
6.  While import trades have shown a declining trend as a proportion
of world import trades,  their  volume  is still significant. The decline
can partially be  explained  by  the  inward  looking import substitution
policies followed by the country. But there is also the gigantic domestic
market whose demand needs to be  met, which  -to some extent- accounts for
the low export rates, and possibly also explains the higher import growth
rate. Overall, the growth of  domestic consumption exceeded that of local
production.
Main Sources of India's Imports (1986)
Percent Share
EEC countries  26.5
Non-OPEC developing countries  18.0
OPEC countries  17.0
COMECON countries  11.1
USA  10.6
Japan  9.1
Others  7.7
Source:  The  Economist  Intelligence  Unit,  Country  Profile  India  1987-88
7.  Looking at the import sector, it becomes apparent that there is
an increasing share of general cargo, which reached 57 percent of India's
total imports (in  terms  of  value)  in  1986.  By  1988,  the shares of
manufactured  goods in the  export  trades,  and  of  general cargo in the
import trades were both approaching 70 percent of total trade volumes. As
a final observation: after a prolonged period of relatively stable annual
trade volumes, India's export and import trades made annual quantum jumps
from 1986 onward.
III. THE PHENOMENON OF CONTAINERIZATION
8.  Why is it so  important  to  single out exports of manufactured
goods and general cargo imports?  Because in each case cargo unitization,
and  especially  containerization  offer  a  significant  potential  for
sizeable  efficiency gains in  logistics management  and reductions in the
costs of physical  distribution  management.  During the period 1987-1988
the total tonnage of  'containerizable'  Indian export and imoort cargoes
had reached a level of  about  16  million. Under the assum  on that the
volumes  of these cargDes  would  show  annual  growth ra+-- close to that
expected for the economy as a  whole  (i.e. about six  ent), one couldcount on an annual incidence  of  such  cargo  in the order of 18 millicn
tons by 1990, 25  million  tons  by  1995  (the  end of the 8th Five-year
Plan), and 32 million tons by the turn of the century.
9.  Containerization of India's trades  has  started with much delay
and at a slow pace. The  reasons are explained in the following secticrs.
During 1987-1988, a total of  5.3  million  tons  of cargo was handled in
containers. What was the previous growth record?
Growth of Containerized Trades in India
Period  Million tons
1980-81  1.4
1981-82  2.0
1982-83  2.1
1983-84  2.2
1984-85  3.3
1985-86  4.0
1986-87  4.5
1987-88  5.3
(Note: The average annual growth rate was 21 percent).
Source: Indian Ports Association.
10.  Despite  the  high  annual  growth  rates,  the  penetration  of
containers in the general cargo  market  is still relatively low. The 5.3
million tons of containerized  cargo  handled during 1987-1988 represents
less than one  third  of  the  total  incidence  of containerizable cargo
during that period.  The  target  under  the  7th  Five-year  Plan was 5C
percent container penetration of national general cargo trades.
Penetration of Containers in General Cargo Traffic
through key Indian Ports  (1987-88)
Port  Imports  Exports  Total
.......  .(percentage  share).
Bombay  23  61  32
Madras  25  58  34
Calcutta  10  34  17
Kandla  11  29  18
Cochin  22  63  45
Haldia  38  100  63
Tuticorin  26  17  22
Total  20  49  °8
Source:  Annual  report  of  the  individual  ports.- 7 -
11.  What is so important to understand  is the fact that India, like
any other country  for  that  matter,  has  no  choice but to drastically
enhance its capacity to handle  export  and import cargoes in containers,
if trade performance is to be improved. Actual or potential foreign trade
partners  have  come  a  long  way  in  cutting  the  costs  of  physical
distribution management for the commodities they buy or sell in the world
market. The  key  ingredient  of  these  arrangements is containerization
which allows  door-to-door  transport,  speedy  intermodal transfers, low
handling costs, reduced breakage  and  pilferage, and thus less insurance
expenses. In fact, most  importers  in  the industrialized countries will
only accept containerized cargo.2 But  much  the  same can be said about
their exports; no seller of  goods  to  India  is likely to continue with
shipments of  cargo in breakbulk. 3 It  is needless to say that the Indian
economy  would  benefit  in  a  very  substantial  way  through  improved
competitiveness  and  higher  revenues  if  further  progress  in
containerization of the export trades  could  be achieved. In the case of
the import  sector,  this  would  imply  lower  costs  in production with
imported  components  and  reduced  domestic  retail  prices  of imported
products. At  the  same  time,  however,  it  should  be  recognized that
considerable  efficiency  gains  through  containerization  can  also  be
expected for the domestic  trades.  Presently  less  than five percent of
domestic general cargo trades are  containerized,  much to the chagrin of
local traders.  During  interviews  with  trading  houses  that serve the
Indian market, these points  were  forcefully  made.  In  the case of one
trader it was speculated that their  annual distribution costs of US$ 182
million, equivalent, could be thus reduced by as much as 25 percent.  The
likely effect on retail prices is obvious.
12.  Attention needs to be drawn  to the ever increasing pressure put
on Indian exporters by their  foreign  trade partners. These entities, be
they manufacturers,  department stores or  wholesalers  in Europe, Japan or
North America, which  have  become  India's  main export markets, undergo
-almost collectively- very drastic changes in inventory management, which
is part of trade logistics.4 Reducing inventories implies a considerable
scope for cost reductions. But  running a business on limited inventories
requires speedy and highly  reliable  supply arrangements. In many cases,
2/  Even  worse,  they insist  nowadays  on full-container-loads  (FCLs),  as  they  do not  want  to go
through  the hassle  of  having to  clear through customs many  smaller  consignments  from
different  sources  loaded  into  one container,  known  as less-than-container-loads  (LCLs).
3/  The low  rate (20  percent)  of containerization  in the import  trades  is  possibly  more  due to
logistics  constraints  which  makes  transport service  provisions  extremely  costly  because  of
long  handling  delays,  problems  with container repositioning  and tracking.  Thus it is  more
the international  transport operator than  the  shipper who  tends  to  go  slow  with  the
introduction  of more import  container  services.
4/  Interestingly,  also  trading  partners  in  the Soviet  Union  -a  major  cltp-,  of  and supplier  to
the  Indian  market- are  in the  process of  instituting  moderr  Dhysical  distribution
management  arrangements.- 8 -
this goes to the extent that product cost considerations are secondary to
effective supply provisions. And,  indeed,  the Indian trade circles have
already had to bear the brunt  of these developments, particularly in the
garment,  shoe  and  handicraft  trades.  To  ensure  that  tight  supply
schedules can be met, about  35  percent  of  the exports  (by  value) from
Northern India  are presently  shipped  by  air -up from seven percent in
1980-, because in many  cases  combined land/ocean transport arrangements
were no longer compatible with  the tight delivery requirements. This has
been a rapid development, and steep further increases in these trades are
expected.  Obviously,  air  cargo  is  also  containerized,  and  all the
observations made above apply.
13.  The point has to be  made  that  containerization has value as a
trade  logistics  management  concept  only  if  there  are  effective
arrangements  that  enable  swift  movements  from  cargo  origin  to
destination. Prerequisite for  efficient  container  trades are therefore
well integrated multi-modal  transport  networks  which  a'low smooth and
speedy transfers from one element in the transport chain to another.
14.  In summary, containerization  of  export  and  import trades has
really been pushed  onto  India  by  its  foreign  trade partners and the
transport industries that  serve  international  trade.  Much of I  ndia's
recent export boom and related  containerization has been driven by small
local manufacturers,5 not the  traditional  large holdings that are often
locked into  a  conservative  trade  management  organization.  The small
exporters' response to this kind of 'grassroots' intermodalism could be a
parallel to the situation in the transport industry, in which innovations
by small groups  of  people  is  creating  modern intermodalism where the
larger organizations have stumbled.6
IV. LOGISTICS PROBLEMS OF INDIAN CONTAINER TRADES
15.  The Government of India (GOI)  is well aware of the volatilities
in today's trade markets and of the colossal restructuring that continues
5l  In order  to overcome  the  inherent logistics  constraints in  the container  trades  and  to
improve  their  responsiveness  to  the demands of  their  foreign  trade  partners,  two industry
associations -whose members are  generally  smaller manufacturers- have established
warehousing  for  their  exports  in Germany and  the  Netherlands,  from  where  they  serve  the
European  market.  Through  these  arrangements  they  have  become  largely  independent  of the
inherent  shortcomings  in  the Indian  logistics  service  sector.
6/  A group in  Bombay  had  established a  successful  sea-land  bridge  service,  called  Seawheels,
which  connected  the Indian  market  with  Europe. Cargo was  tra-sDorted  by  sea to  Kuwait  anc
from  there  by truck to  Europe. Time  and  cost  savings oe-  'sea  only'  transport  were
substantial  (S  days and USS  400 per container).  The  Gulf  war o:t an  end to  this innovative
service.to take place  within  international  trade  and transport circles. While
there is a rightful satisfaction over the fact that the country's exports
to overseas markets have been booming  during more recent years, there is
at the same  time  growing  concern  over  India's ability to effectively
adjust to  the  changing  international  market  environment  so that any
deterioration  in  export  performance  could  be  timely  contained.
Furthermore, to increase  its  exports,  India  will  have  to find newer
products and different markets. Absorption and assimilation of technology
and particularly  the introduction  of effective logistics arrangements by
the Indian industry and  service  sector  will  play a tremendous role in
such endeavor. If the  Indian  industry  can  export  goods at prices and
under delivery conditions which  are  internationally competitive, and if
it is able to find  and  cater  for  newer  markets, then Indian trade is
bound to grow. In  the  same  vein,  if  India  is able to streamline the
organizational  setup for managing  the  logistics  of import and domestic
trades, then the costs  of  commodities  in  the  national market will be
substantially reduced. The realities  are  fare  from  it, and there is a
real danger that the country's trade performance will deteriorate.
16.  Efficient  logistics arrangements become  more and more important
as a prerequisite  for  successful  conduct  and  development of trade in
India. And the quintessential  requirement  for effective trade logistics
arrangements  (which  have  such  a  significant  influence  on delivered
product costs)7 in today's market  is containerization. But the container
will be instrumental in this respect  only if there is a well established
framework for its streamlined and -above all- speedy intermodal movement,
from  origin  to  destination.  Any  interruption  in  this  flow  chain
represents costs which will ultimately  be reflected in delivered product
prices. In the case of India there are many interruptions in the chain of
container  movement.8 The  (arguably  avoidable)  costs  of  these
interruptions keep  mounting,  a  phenomenon  which  goes against India's
desire to improve its competitive  posture in international markets. This
is all the more serious  as  many  of  the country's competitors in world
markets make  swift moves  to  improve their trade logistics arrangements,
and the differences in freight costs are telling.
7/  Logistics costs,  including inventories,  warehousing, cargo handling, transport, and
insurance,  typically  range  between  25 and  40 percent  of  final  product  costs.
8/  There is  a  frequently encountered  myth  in  India: the  belief  that increased  container
handling  and transport costs due  to  inefficiencies  in  logistics arrangements  will  be
absorbed  by the  service  industries,  like  shipping. The  fact is,  however,  that it  is  always
the buyer  at  the end of the  chain  who  has  to muster  the bill;  everybody  else is  passing  on
such 'inefficiency  costs'.  In  the  end,  and for  obvious  reasons,  such  afflicted  buyers  will
curtail  their interaction  with  trade  partners whose  logistics costs  are inflated  by the
effects  of system  inefficiencies.- 10  -
Comparative Container Freight Rates9
Through-Transport Rates in US$
Destination
Detroit  Nuremberg
New Delhi  3,700  2,705
Bombay  3,300  2,305
Bandung  3,120  2,075
Bangkok  2,620  2,075
Guangzhou  2,745  2,350
Nanjing  2,880  2,465
Petaling Jaya  2,520  1,925
Seoul  2,502  2,182
Singapore  2,520  1,825
Taipei  2,770  1,975
(Note: Rates valid on  May  15,  1989,  per  20 foot container, including
precarriage, non-conference  sea  transport  and  oncarriage costs. Ocean
freight rates were  quoted  in  US  Dollars,  local transport and freight
handling rates were converted  into  US  Dollars at the official exchange
rates.)
Source:  Lloyd's  Intermodal  Asia,  June  1989.
17.  For  the  8th  Five-year  Plan,  the  Government  of  India  has
established a target of 70  percent  container penetration in the general
cargo trades. A total of 25  million tons of 'containerizable' export and
import cargoes is projected for 1995,  the  end of the Plan period. If 70
percent of that volume would be  containerized,  there would be a need to
move about 1.5 million containers10 through the national trade logistics
system. Is  this  target  realistic?  Trade  growth  has  already exposed
inherent constraints in the  national  transport  network  in the shape of
ports, road, rail  and  shipping  systems,  that  as  yet have had little
chance of dealing with  the  numbers  of  containers that have started to
come their way. Clearly, the intermodal  sector  has a lot of catching up
to do. But trying to push  the transport industry to change quickly takes
9/  The sizeable  cost  differential  between  cargo  from  Indian  origins  and cargo  from  other  Asian
sources  is largely  due to  comparatively  high  costs of container  handling  and transport,
i.e.  pre-ocean  carriage  costs,  in  India. Reflecting inefficiencies  in local  ports,  the
ocean  freight  rates  out of India are  also  comparatively  high.  Except  for Indonesia,  there
is  only limited  variation  among  ocean  freight  rates  applicable  to the  other  countries.
lo/  Assuming  11.7  tons  of cargo,  on average,  per  TEU (Twenty-Foot-Equivalent-Unit)  in  1995.  The
revenue  cargo  per  TEU is  presently averaging just  under  ,e  tons in  India,  reflecting  a
still limited  efficiency  in container stuffing operations.  But as  experience  buiIds  up,
container  loads  can be  expected  to increase.- 11  -
one into the real  nature  of  the  Indian  economy. Transport, like most
other things in  India,  is  run  through  bureaucratic  rules not easily
shifted. This is  because  laws,  controls  and  licenses  are the levers
through which a highly  centralized  system  of economic management moves
India's resources and outputs.
18.  Infrastructure,  services  and  control  by  the  public
administration are all  equally  important.  However, the infrastructure
aspects are possibly the  least  cumbersome,  as capacity expansion needs
can usually be identified and met  in a straightforward way -provided the
required funds are available.  There  are serious capacity constraints in
ports, road and railway  networks,  and  related rolling stock. There are
also significant capacity constraints in the national warehousing  system.
These constraints exert their influence on handling rates, transit times,
and cargo turnover to  varying  degrees.  But  importantly, many of these
constraints are not so much due  to physical limitations, they are rather
the consequence of poor  productivity  and heavy-handed control by public
agencies.
19.  Poor productivity is a sad hallmark of most entities involved in
serving the container trades: the  ports, railways, inland depots and the
national warehousing  system. What are  the root causes of this situation?
They  include  union  influence,  protectionist  arrangements  and  undue
intervention by  the  public  administration  in  its  different branches
(central, state and municipal),  limited incentives for facility managers
to do a better job, and  -unfortunately- also very often limited know-how
in modern container management techniques.
20.  Government control extends over  customs involvement in clearing
cargo,11 the regulation of shipping, the operation of ports, railways and
warehouses,  and  the  provision  of  cargo  management  (e.g.  freight
forwarding)  services. In the  case  of  shipping,  ports and railways the
influence of the labor unions exacerbates these circumstances.
21.  The  situation  in  portsl2 is  mostly  depressing. Performance
indicators  for  all  types  of  cargo  handling  are  extremely  low  by
international  standards. This applies particularly to containers. Despite
the low wages  in India, the  costs of handling containers and their cargo
in ports is about 80 percent higher  (on  a per unit basis) than in  more
costly Japan or the U.S.A.13 The  explanation  lies  in the fact that in
India on average 25 workers are assigned  to a job for which in the other
11/  Which includes  not  only  import and  export trades, but  also  applies  to purely  domestic
cabotage  trades.  The control of  locally traded  commodities by  excise  agents  is  equally
cumbersome.
12/  Madras  is  a notable  exception. The  port  has  good  and imaginative  management,  relatively
well run  facilities,  and undergoes  a  significant  expansion  program  with  assistance  from  the
ADB.
13/  A  comparison  with  Singapore is  even  more  drastic. The  cost  of hand' g  a  Twenty-foot
container  in  the  city  state's  port  is  USt 100,  compared with  USS 218  in  B-tsay  and USS 170
in  Madras.- 12  -
two  countries  five  workers  are  required,  and  these  five  workers
accomplish  about  three  times  the  daily  output  of  their  25 Indian
counterparts. High staffing  levels  and  poor  productivity afflict also
other elements of  the  trade  logistics  service industries. Indian flag
carriers  have  about  three  times  the  crew  size  of  their  foreign
competitors. The serious overstaffing  of  the  Indian railways is a well
known and documented fact. The same observation applies to warehouses and
inland container depots.
22.  Equipment availability  for  cargo  and  container  handling and
transport  is  low.  Inefficient  maintenance  practices,  obsolete
technologies and poor management -and thus many units being out of order-
account for much of this  fact.14 Furthermore, in critical segments of
the logistics  network  there  is  a  serious  limitation  in  numDers o:
available  units,  regardless  of  the  management  and  maintenance
arrangements.  This  applies  for  instance  to  flatbed  cars  for  rail
transport of containers, and special  handling equipment in ports, iniand
depots and warehouses,  such as gantry cranes, heavy duty loaders and yard
trailers.
23.  The effects of  these  constraints  are  long  waiting times for
ships  and  containers,  which  completely  defeats  the  advantage  of
containerizing cargo. These  waiting  times  are  often excessive and add
measurably to the costs of cargo movement.15 Rail transport of containers
to and from Northern India (where  about  70 percent of the Indian export
trades originate) takes between  10  and  25 days. Technically, this move
could be accomplished in three  days. In addition, tariffs for containers
handling  and  transport  are  inordinately  high  in  ports  and  on the
railways.16
24.  But the technical problems -serious  as they are- are dwarfed by
the sheer overwhelming maze  of  regulations, control and interference by
public institutions in the  processing  of  all  trades in India, be they
export, import or purely domestic  trades.  Everything has to be minutely
documented, and the documentation  requirements are excessive. For import
14/  Procurement  of spare  parts  is  frequently  delayed  because  of  financial  constraints,  which is
further  aggravated  by  the required  payment  of 80-100  percent  import  duties.
15/  Container  charges  at  Bombay  port  were increased by  44 percent  in  January  1989  (rising  from
USS 188  to  USS 238 per  TEU)  as  a  result  of real  or 'artificial'  capacity  constraints,  and
resulting  excessive  waiting  times  for  ships  and cargoes.
16/  The transport  of  a  whole  wagon load of  garments  or handicrats -two  of today's  key  export
items-  in  breakbulk  form  from  New  Delhi  to  Bombay or Macras  costs  only  about  one  third  of
the same  railway  service  for  a  Twenty-foot  container.  It *s  thus  understandable  that  many
Indian shippers  have  little predilection for containerizirg  their  products.- 13 -
clearance a total of 23  documents  have  to be prepared.17 In the export
trades 118 pieces  of  paper  are  needed  to  get  a  consignment to its
destination. On average 22 hours are spent in preparing the various forms
required for each consignment.  These  facts have to be measured against
changing documentation practices elsewhere  in  the world.18 Most notable
is, however, the rapid  progression of computer-aided 'paperless trading'
which has also taken hold of trade centers in Asia.19
25.  If documentation requirements are already excessive, the effects
on time and  costs  of  cargo  inspection  and clearance arrangements are
simply unequalled. For export clearance,  258 signatures are required, it
takes on average six weeks to  obtain  an import license, and 21 days are
required for customs clearance.20 It is estimated that about ten percent
of the value of traded  commodities21 is  spent  in paper work and going
through required procedures.
26.  Beyond their obvious effects on time and costs, these cumbersome
practices  exert considerable influence on the organizational arrangements
for  container  logistics.  And,  again,  the  potential  advantages  of
containerized  trades  are  defeated.  First  of  all,  very  few  import
containers move  beyond  port  perimeters  under  bond.22 Customs usually
17/  Although  there  exists  an  arrangement,  called  Open  General  License  (OGL)  which was
established  by Customs with the  aim  of  reducing  import  trade control barriers. About 80
percent of all  imports are governed by OGL  provisions. But in the end, OGL did not produce
the  intended  effects  as  overly  strong  preoccupation  with  protecting  the  country's
industries against imports, and collecting import duties was  overriding.
18/  Container moves between Asia's newly  industrialized  economies and North America or Europe
are usually handled with  less than five documents.
19/  For  instance, almost one fourth of Singapore's trade and  related transport transactions are
presently organized  without conventional documentation.  It  is  expected that more than 50
percent of these activities will take  place  'paperless'  by 1992.  Importantly, there are
similar developments  in other regional countries.
20/  Customs officials fear that  officers  delegated  to  high-intensity export operations will
start sympathizing too much with trade. This  is  a  fear  partly borne out in the abuse of
customs privileges at some of India's export-oriented manufacturing  zones, but it is garded
against  largely at the expense of the smooth flow of trade.
21/  The Federation  of Freight Forwarders Associations  of  India estimates that the cost burden
is about 375 per TEU.
22/  Less than ten  percent of import containers move  inland without customs inspection in ports.
They are carried by rail and have  to be submitted for customs inspection at government-run
inland container depots. If a  shipper  wants  to  arrange  for  t-,ck  transport of a bonded
container, a  security amounting to 2.5 times  the declared value  -;  the container's  content
has to be deposited.- 14 -
inspects ten percent of all  containers.  But  this is not interpreted as
that percentage of all units, rather ten percent of each container's load
is inspected. Many shippers  prefer  truck transport of their containers,
once cleared by customs because of the unreliable and time consuming rail
services, and because of the advantage  of direct delivery. And yet again
customs comes into play by  not  accepting  containers as a carrier23 but
rather as vessel equipment.  Thus  for  each  container leaving a port, a
security deposit of US$ 3,000/TEU24 is  required, and the unit has to be
returned within  60 days. More  recently, international carriers have been
able to arrange for 'revolving bonds'.
27.  Much of the  above  can  also  be  said  about the still limited
domestic container  trades.  It  is  just  that  instead  of  the custons
authorities one deals with the  excise  bureaucracy. In short, it becomes
easily apparent why almost one  fourth  of  the costs of Indian container
trades  is  due  to  a  mindless  paperchase.  But  possibly  even  more
consequential is the resulting  damper  put  on further advances in cargo
unitization.
28.  Finally  a  word  about  communications.  Judging  by  ongoing
developments elsewhere ir.  the world,  much efficiency in container trades
is  achieved  through  electronic  networking.  Through  these  networks
information is swapped  on  trade  and  transport markets, freight rates,
ship movements,  available capacity  in  ports, depots, railways, trucking
-and  also  customs  services.  Bills  of  lading  are  electronica7ly
transmitted,  and  customs  authorities  in  increasing  numbers  turn to
preclearance of cargo on  the  basis  of  information thus received. Most
importantly,  electronically  transmitted  messages  allow  substantial
improvements  in  the  management  -and  thus  utilization-  of logistics
facilities, and traders have  a  better  way  of scanning the markets for
more demand-responsive  sales  and  arranging for cost-effective logistics
provisions.  In fact, the  entire  international trading community and the
service sector  are  progressively  interconnected,  including importers,
exporters, transport  operators  and  infrastructure  facilities, agents,
freight  forwarders,  brokers,  banks,  and  insurance  companies.  The
facilitating  -and logistics cost  reducing- effects of these technologies
are very real in today's market,  and  many countries make  swift moves to
tie into the available networks.25
23/  In  fact,  to be  effective,  the container has  to be  the carrier  and ships,  railways,  trucks
or airplanes  are merely  the propulsive  units.
24/  Which is  excessive,  considering  that  a  Twenty-foot container presently  costs  about  US$
1,800  in  the international  market.
2E/  Much pioneering  efforts have  gone  into these arrangements by  various  UN agencies,  in
particular  the Economic Commission for  Europe  (ECE).  Under  ECE's  aus,  ces a universal
system,  syntax  and standard  formats for  trade  and transport  related  ne  -crlking  have  been
developed,  called  EDIFACT  (=  Electronic  Data  Interchange  for  Administ-'  on,  Commerce  and
Transport).  Following  its incursion  in  Europe,  EDIFACT  is  progressives ne,ng  introduced  in
many  other  economies  in  different  regions of  the  world,  including  deve  -Zing  countries  in
increasing  numbers.- 15 -
29.  Only very few of such  facilities  are available in India. Those
who have taken  action  are  some  foreign  carriers realizing that their
business in serving the Indian  market  had become so bogged down through
related  inefficiencies  which  had  started  to  affect  the  overall
performance of their  global  service  network.26 Bitter complaints about
this situation are expressed by  industrialists, traders and providers of
logistics services. There  is  an  eerie  sentiment  ir. many quarters of
'loosing out to the foreign competition'.  But in India, there is another
issue which undermines any effort to streamline documentation procedures.
Because there is no officially  endorsed concept of combined transport of
goods27 -an important requirement  for  effective container trades- there
is also no  multi-modal  or  combined  transport  document. Thus separate
documents have to  be  issued  for  each  mode  that carries a container.
Compounding these arduous requirements  is  the  fact that under existing
regulations,  each  mode  has  different  liability  provisions.28 These
provisions were established decades  ago,  and thus insurance coverage by
domestic carriers, especially  the  railways,  are totally inadequate for
traded commodities in today's market.
3D.  There is also much confusion  over  the ownership of goods, once
dispatched by an Indian  exporter. Under existing legislative provisions,
export cargo is considered as  such  by  the authorities once it has been
physically placed on  a  ship,  and  an  ocean  bill-of-lading is issued.
Negotiability  is  thereby  impeded.  Thus  a  shipper  cannot process his
documents, like letters of credit  through the banking system, until such
act has taken place. The transmittal  of  the various documents to a bank
that in turn would  liquidate  documentary credits, is inordinately long.
Consequently, the shipper is deprived  of  his  rightful cash claim for a
long time which  unduly  curtails  his  financial  flexibility. The story
could go on and on. The  upshot  is, however, that totally obsolete and a
bewildering  variety  of  documentation  and  liability  arrangements for
different providers  of  logistics  services  impose  a  heavy  burden on
container trades in India.
26/  For instance,  American  President  Lines  (APL),  with  70 years  tradition  in  serving  India  and
catering  for almost  two thirds  of  the  country's  overseas  container  trades,  has linked  its
Indian  network  through a  company-owned  trade  and  transport  information  satellite.  Thus
APL's  communications,  say,  between  New  Delhi,  Madras and  Bombay  are handled  on line,  with
under  four  seconds  response  time.
27/  The Government  still  pursues a  policy of  treating each  element  of  the transport  chain
separately.
28/  An  exception  applies  to foreign  carriers who  can issue  combined  tra-si-  documents  under
one insurance  coverage,  provided  their insurers  -mostly  the internat;-s,  P&I and  TT clubs-
are  willing  to cover  the risks  involved.- 16  -
V. THE PROVIDERS OF TRADE LOGISTICS SERVICES
31.  The number and variety  of  actors  on the scene are confusingly
diverse. It is best to distinguish them by function; they include:
*  the transport  industries,  i.e.  ocean  and coastal
shipping; 9 the  railways,  trucking,  air transport
and  to  a  much  lesser  extent  inland  waterways
transport.
*  the  entrepot  system,  including  ports, terminals,
airports,  inland  depots,  freight  stations  and
warehouses;
*  the cargo  management  services, comprising shipping
agents,  consolidators,  freight  forwarders  and
clearing agents; and finally
*  the shippers either  acting  on  their own behalf or
through trading houses.
The Transport Industries
32.  Ocean Shipping: India's  fleet  expanded  from just over 300,000
Gross  Registered  Tons  (GRT)  in  1948  to  6.8  million  GRT  in  1987
(representing  0.4  percent  and  1.7  percent  of  the  world's  tonnage,
respectively). There are 52 shipowning companies with the public sector's
share in the  national  fleet  amounting  to  almost  60  percent.30 The
majority of the  Indian  fleet  are  bulk  carriers. Until recently, only
three companies owned 96.6 percent  of the country's liner tonnage -which
is the source of  container  carrying capacity. These companies included:
the publicly owned Shipping Corporation  of  India (SCI), and the private
carriers India Steamship  Corporation  and  Scindia Steam Navigation, the
oldest shipping venture in India with  a tradition bridging more than 100
years. But after a long  period  of faltering fortunes, Scindia went into
bankruptcy early this year.31
33.  Scindia's fate seems  to  reflect  an  ailment that afflicts the
entire  Indian  shipowning  establishment:  financial  difficulties.  The
private shipping industry is indebted to the tune of US$ 600 million, and
this amount is substantially  higher  if  one includes the publicly owned
shipping assets. The net worth  of  the  industry as a whole is negative,
29/  India  has  also inter-island  shipping  services, but  they  are  less  important  in  the  present
context.
30/  In  1961,  the private  sector  owned  96 percent  of India's  fleet
31/  Discussions  are being  held  to  incorporate  Scindia's  assets  irto  SCI.- 17  -
with an average equity/debt ratio of 1 to 68. National shipping companies
in increasing numbers are not able to service their debts.
34.  At its own peak as  a  company in the 1970s, Scindia represented
the high  point  of  an  alliance  between  India's nationalistic private
shipping companies and Government  money,  surpassing  the backing of any
other industry.  India's  development  oriented  Merchant Shipping Act of
1958 was intended to feed massive funds to the private shipping sector to
build Indian ships for Indian cargoes  -a goal of self-sufficiency in the
early search for economic  independence.  But  the open-ended approach to
tonnage supply  was  not  changed  even  after  world  market  demand for
shipping altered radically from  1974  onward.  If  anything, the flow of
cash was liberalized  further  with  the  so-called 'needs based' finance
policy. The resulting case-by-case  mentality also signified that 'needs-
based' came to mean exactly what  it said: whoever appeared to need money
the most got it,  regardless  of  the  real  strength  of the company and
regardless of the  wider  market  situation.  But  with income failing to
recover in the wake of successive  recessions in the world market, a debt
trap developed. Assets could not be realized by sale because asset values
had dropped far  below  outstandings,  and  the  ships  Indian owners had
acquired got poor  rates  with  little  income  to  diversify. The 'needs
based' system then  too  easily  changed  from  funds  for new ships into
something else: emergency  budget  support,  with  a  moratorium here and
rescheduling  there  -all  precedents  which,  once  set,  soon  became
politically very hard to end.
35.  The role of the  Shipping  Development Fund Committee  (SDFC)  was
critical in all these  developments.  SDFC  was abolished in late 1986,
with  liabilities  totalling  US$  352  million.  A  new  instrument, the
Shipping Credit and Investment Corporation of India (SCICI)  was formed to
take over ship finance matters.  SCICI  has  now a plan to restructure the
debt of the ten strongest companies.  The  plan is not without  demands as
seven of the companies will have  to  be merged. Will SCICI succeed? That
is still difficult to assess. But an indication of SCICI's different mode
of operation is its recent exercise  to raise US$ 50 million  from foreign
markets. This might allow it to  provide foreign currency loans to Indian
shipowners who  have  faced  difficulties  in  raising  foreign exchange,
particularly  as India has rigid foreign exchange controls.
36.  Unfortunately,  things will  not  be  as  easy  as  it may sound.
Because of their continuing  financial  plight, Indian shipping companies
have not  been  able  to  modernize  their  fleets  in  line  with market
developments.  These realities  are  compounded  by  the  fact that Indian
carriers have  to  order  newbuildings  and  arrange  for  ship repair in
domestic yards on a  preferential  basis. Indian yards reportedly produce
ships at a cost which  is  about  40 percent higher than the international
market prices,32 and  delivery  times exceed internationally acceptable
32/  Similarly,  Indian  carriers  have  to  buy  locally made  containers  on a priority  basis.  But
such  containers  are  more costly than  identical units manufac'>  -od for  instance  in  South
Korea (USS  2,500  versus  USS 1,800 for  a  Twenty-foot  contain-). Apparently,  much  of  this
difference  is  due to a high  tax on steel  in  India.- 18  -
standards by substantial margins. As  a  result, India's share in general
cargo trades is still dominated by conventional cargo liners.
37.  Initiating  India's  deep-sea  container  fleet  has  suffered
innumerable false starts over the last few years. Various plans to buy or
order new tonnage have abounded but to no avail. The failure to invest in
cellular tonnage  has  occurred  in  spite  of  an  accelerating  flow of
containers on  India's  main  liner  trades,  and  it  means  that Indian
shipping has been losing out  in  this  respect to foreign carriers. Only
about ten percent of Indian  container traffic is carried by domestically
owned vessels. Both India Steamship  and  SCI have taken steps to enhance
their container  services  but  their  ability  to  implement any further
improvements  and  -notably-  to  provide  competitive  services  against
foreign operators, will depend greatly on whether resources are available
for further fleet modernization.  Because  of  the  lack of investment  rn
modern and  purpose-built  vessels,  the  Indian  fleet  has very limited
container capacity. It does not include a single fully cellular container
ship.  The  only  fully  dedicated  vessel  is  India  Steamship's  RcRo
containership of 1977 vintage -the Indian Courier- with 393 TEU capacity,
which is used for regional  feeder  services.  The composition of the SC:
fleet illustrates this predicament,  with  just  over 10,200 TEU carrying
capacity spread over 30  traditional  combination vessels of considerable
age. Overall, the Indian fleet is  ageing  with 80 percent of the tonnage
more than ten years old. Scrapping  of older, inefficient tonnage is long
overdue. Several liner managements would like to arrange for scrapping of
such undue liabilities, but  the  Government's  insistence to approve any
proposed  fleet consolidation usually  implies  long delays in taking such
action.
38.  Earlier on there was  a  proposal  to  form the Indian Container
Lines  (ICL)  grouping  as  an  all-India  container  carrying consortium,
including SCI, Scindia and India  Steamship.33 The intention was to beat
the heavy foreign competition. And this competition is strong, com rising
30 lines or consortia, and  some  25 independent feeder operators.34 Much
to the dismay of Indian  shipping  companies, the foreign carriers pursue
very  aggressive  marketing  strategies  and  have  established efficient
service arrangements.35 The  strong  point  of  these foreign carriers is
33/  The idea  was not  further  pursued  after  the Scindia  dilemma.
34/  It is  intriguing  to note  such  heavy  involvement  of foreign  carriers  in  the Indian  market,
despite  its  serious shortcomings in  logistics  arrange- ments. The  only  plausible
explanation  appears  to be that  foreign carriers place a lot  of  expectation  in  the future
growth  of Indian  container  trades,  and  they  want  to become  timely  involved.
35/  Wost  of these  carriers  serve  the  Indian market through  feeder  operations  out of  Colombo,
Dubai  or Singapore.  Only  two groups  -Hoegh Lines and the Cobra  Consortium-  call  on Indiar
ports  with  mainline  vessels.  However,  these  vessels  are  re  a',vely  small (usually  less  thar
1,000  TEU capaci-  ty).  The other carriers do not  provide  -a  nline  services  either  because
of the  notoriously  low  productivity  in  most  Indiar, Oo-ts,  or  because  of the still
relatively  thin container  trades  into  and out  of India,  *h  - does  not  warrant  calls  of  the
costly  mainline  ships.- 19  -
their  experience  in  dealing  with  container  trades  and  multi-modal
transport operations, which the Indian  lines  do not possess to the same
degree.36
39.  Because they  are  in  a  competitive  disadvantage,  the Indian
shipping lines -and especially  SCI-  do  everything possible to sabotage
any plan to  introduce  cost-reducing  container  service arrangements by
foreign carriers. They often succeed in pulling in the Government to take
prohibiting steps.37 SCI has also been able to obtain Government approval
to sit as managing agency in many nodes of the container transport chain,
such as  the  inland  depots.  Thus  they  have  established an effective
network for gathering  intelligence  on  who  is contracted for container
moves, and what the contractual arrangements are.
40.  Obviously, this  kind  of  market  intervention  carries a heavy
price in terms of container moves.  The Indian shippers and their foreign
trade partners are not particularly  happy about these circumstances. But
ironically, it has to be said at  the same time that, although the Indian
trades are covered  by  29  different  conferences  in the ocean shipping
sector, most  shipping  services  are  provided  outside  the confines of
conf.erence  rules. This includes  national  as  well  as foreign lines. In
this respect the Indian scene is truly exceptional.
41.  The fallacy for Indian lines, notably for SCI, is that they have
no tonnage capable of competing at attractive rates and -indeed- with the
efficiencies of handling containers  in  today's market. Earlier on, they
chartered cellular  ships  or  arranged  for  slot  charters with foreign
carriers.  These  arrangements  were  cost-effective  and  provided  an
acceptable basis for  service  provisions.  However,  in  the wake of the
current surge of  international  demand  for container carrying capacity,
the lease  contracts  were  not  extended.38 Thus  Indian  carriers with
ambition to compete in the container  trades  are largely left out in the
cold. In the meantime, their  foreign competitors made handy profits from
a  steep surge of seatrade volumes on the world market during 1988.
42.  If the prospects for Indian  carriers  of having a fair share in
internationally traded general  cargo,  and  especially  in the container
markets  are bleak,  they  are  even  bleaker  as regards domestic coastal
36/  In  fact, looking  at selected  productivity rates  reveals  a  rather  discouraging  picture.  For
instance,  in  Madras  SCI loads  or  unloads  containers from  its  ships  at a  rate  of  eight  TEU
per hour;  foreign  carriers  -essentially  feeder  ships-  handle  18 to  18 TEU in  the same  time.
37/  APL wanted  to arrange  for priority  berthing in  the  Port  of Madras  for a  proposed  regular
service  with  a  mainline  cellular vessel of  2,800 TEU carrying  capacity.  The Ministry  of
Surface  Transport's  port  wing  cleared this  proposal  which could,  however,  not  materialize
due to opposition  from  the  Ministry's  shipping  wing,  as a  result  or SCI  intervention.
38/  In the same  vein,  newbuilding  prices  have  increased and yard  ca)acities  are occupied  for
several  years  in  advance.- 20 -
shipping.39 Coastal  shipping  services  in  India  can  be  provided by
national flag carriers only. In 1952, the cabotage trade of general cargc
represented about 50  percent  of  total  coastal  ship movements. Today,
there is  practically  no  general  cargo  moved  in  the coastal trades.
Advances in the land  transport  networks  and appalling port performance
records account for much of these developments.
43.  The Railways:  When  the  need for effective inland distributicn
of containers escalated  into  a  serious  issue,  the Government's first
reaction was  to  use  India's  extensive  national  railway network -the
largest in Asia- as the main system. But the railways had too little time
left over after  organizing  movements  of  essential  bulks, to give the
specialized attention needed for container traffic that is high in value.
Aggravating this situation -and  biasing  the  minds of railway managers-
was the fact that  container  volumes  make  up  less the 0.05 percent of
Indian rail goods  traffic.  Thus  arrangements for efficient container
traffic management did really not  materialize; this traffic was actually
treated as a  marginal,  and  often  unwelcome  activity by regional rail
managers.
44.  In the  meantime,  the  Government  instituted  rules which made
inland transport of containers by  any mode other than railways extremely
cumbersome.  In support  of  the  railway  operations, the development of
inland container depots (ICDs)  was initiated. These ICDs were to serve as
cargo clearance centers and as  facilities  for stuffing and stripping of
containers outside the already  congested  ports.  Further details on the
lCD system are given below.
45.  In the operating mode,  Indian  railways have introduced flatbed
cars that are designed to  carry Twenty-foot and Forty-foot IS040 contai-
ners, as well as Eight-foot domestic containers.41 Under current arrange-
ments,  rakes with a  capacity  to  transport  70  TEUs are in use. Since
these rakes compete with other  cargo  and  passenger trains for the same
track in the heavily  trafficked  corridors  between Bombay or Madras and
Northern India, they are frequently delayed because they are shunted ontc
sidings to give way for what  is considered higher priority traffic. Thus
there are  the  excessive  transit  times  which  were  reported earlier.
Apparently  there are now new cars being designed to get 105 TEUs into the
same train length, a productivity  gain  which  will be critical with the
expected throughput by the end  of the century, requiring three container
trains a day -rather than  per  week-  on  the busy lines between Bombay,
Madras and New Delhi.
39/  Income  generated  by coastal or  inter-island  shipping of general  cargo  could  potentially
mitigate  to some  extent  their  poor  financial  performance  in  the international  trades.
40/ International  Standards  Organization
41/  Permission  to  use  ISC  sea  containers  in domestic  trades  was  ;  ven  in  1984  only.- 21 -
46.  There is  much  aggravation  among  shippers  over  the frequent
inability of the railways to  provide information about the departure and
arrival of container trains. This  fact undermines any effort to organize
the speedy and reliable  deliveries  which  are  ranking so highly in the
decision-making behavior within international  trade circles.  The upshot
of these dismal circumstances  is  that  much  investment will have to go
into track modernization, acquisition of purpose-built hauling equipment,
and the installation of  effective  communication systems if the railways
want to fulfill their assigned  function in container inland distribution
efficiently.42 But most importantly,  the attitudes of railway management
with regard to container transport have to be changed.
47.  A situation which  further  undermines  the effectiveness of the
railways in facilitating inland container moves are the existing tariffs,
which actually discriminate  against  transport of containerized cargo.43
Thus many  shippers and  consignees  in India have identical apprehensions
and consequently, a substantial volume of containerizable cargo continues
to move in breakbulk form. At  the  bottom of these realities is the fact
that most commercial criteria applied  by  the railways are still derived
from the basic legislation which was established a generation ago. Urgent
reforms are required in this respect. The same observation applies to the
liability provisions currently  in  use  by  the  railways for cargo -and
therefore also container- traffic. Compensation  for cargo loss or damage
during handling  or  transport  by  the  railways  is totally inadequate,
because the compensation amounts  reflect market conditions prevailing in
the 1920s.
48.  Trucking:  When asked, most  shippers in the Indian market would
state that they prefer truck  transport of containers over rail transport
-despite the fact that such transport is at their risk in the case of on-
carriage  after  customs  inspection.  Truck  transport  allows  higher
operational  flexibility and -most importantly- door-to-door deliveries.44
These  attitudes  prevail,  despite  the  fact  that  trucking  rates for
containers  are  not  more  favorable  than  the  tariffs  charged  by the
railways. Quite often, trucking rates are high because of s ecial chassis
requirements for container transport, which  is expensive.4 :  All told, it
42/  There is  also  an urgent  need  to  expand  the available  stock  of  containers,  particularly  for
the  domestic  trades.
43/  Complicating  matters  further,  the railways  also  apply  surcharges  for non-ISO  units,  such  as
high-cube and  longer than  Forty-foot  containers,  which  are  increasingly  used  in
international  trades.
44/  Trucking an  import container from  Bombay or  Madras to  Northern India  is usually
accomplished  in less  than  20  percent  of  the  time required  for the  same  move  by rail.  Users
of trucking  services report substantial  efficiency gains  in  container  management.  The
experience  points  to an average  of  B6  km  per  day haulage  performance  by train,  compared
with  about  400 km  per day by  truck.
46/  There are also  instances of high  trucking  costs  but  this  largely due to the  requirement
that the empty  containers  have  to  be  returned  after  stripping  its content, and the
associated  expenses  incurred by the trucker are  included in the freigrt  ate.- 22 -
is really the time  element  that  influences shippers' modal preference.
However, existing customs  rules  impede  trucking arrangements consider-
ably. Bonded containers can  be  moved  without regulatory constraints by
rail but not by trucks because  there are the heavy security requirements
in terms of financial guarantees  to  be  given by the operator. About 80
percent of trucking services available on the local market are offered by
small  entities  -in  most  cases  owners-operators.  These  small-scale
enterprises simply  do  not  have  the  financial  means  to provide such
guarantees. Thus trucking is no  real  competition for the railways under
current conditions, which  on  one  hand  makes  the railways' management
possibly more complacent, and on  the other hand represents a significant
avoidable logistics cost component.
49.  Unfortunately the situation is  not  quite  as  simple as it may
sound. Even if trucking was put  on an equal footing with railways, there
are severe constraints in  terms  of equipment and infrastructure. Trucks
with the carrying capacity  and  axle  configuration required for hauling
loaded ISO standard containers  are  still  in extreme shortage in India.
Furthermore,  the existing road  and bridge infrastructure has substantial
geometric and structural shortcomings that put a damper on widespread use
of heavy container road haulage equipment.
50.  But the demand for 'putting road transport on equal footing with
the railways' as far  as  container  inland  distribution is concerned is
very real among trading circles in India. At the very least, shippers ask
that trucking services be liberalized  to  the extent that more efficient
multi-modal  land transport arrangements  can  be  organized. Going by the
experience  record  of  other  countries  that  have  gone  through  the
containerization  process,  this  demand  is  plausible  and  should  be
supported to the extent possible.
51.  Air transport: The rapidly growing  trend to ship export cargoes
by air was already indicated.  Most  of this cargo comprises manufactured
goods -not necessarily  all  of  high  value-  destined for the European,
North American and Japanese  consumer  markets. The services are provided
by a variety  of  carriers  that  serve  the  Indian market, although the
Government encourages the use of  India's international flag carrier -Air
India.46 Today, the bulk of  these shipments originates within  the larger
metropolitan  areas around the major international airports, because it is
here where  most  manufacturing  activities  are  still concentrated. But
there  are  developments  elsewhere,  for  instance  in  Rajasthan,  of
increasing production activities in the merchandise sector whose outputs47
are targeted for the consumption  centers  in overseas markets. To ensure
success, these regional industries  are critically dependent on effective
air transport arrangements, which are presently difficult to organize.
52.  The increasing volume of air cargo implies that the conventional
combined passenger-cargo  configurations of  airplanes do not suffice much
46/  The carriers  that  serve within the  domestic markets, in  pa-t;cuIar Indian  Airways,
concentrate  mainly  on passenger  service.  Their  annual  cargo  volumes  are relatively  small.
47/  Particularly  textiles,  garments,  handicrafts  and  artware.- 23 -
longer. All-cargo carriers are  required,  and  these are in short supply
anywhere in the  world because  the  phenomenon  of cargo air transport is
not limited to  India.48 Air  India's  cargo  services  have brought the
carrier to its capacity limits.  Foreign  carriers are still reluctant to
fill the growing gap  with  dedicated  equipment because of the logistics
problems on the  ground.49 As  an  exception,  Aeroflot  has entered the
market with its heavy-lift, military  style  equipment to haul import and
export trades between India and the Soviet Union. 0
53.  Indian  shippers  make  the  point  that  jet-powered  cargo air
transport -common elsewhere- is  not  necessarily  a  must for the Indian
situation. The  need  is  to  reduce  long  transit  times of merchandise
transported to overseas markets by  ship.  Cutting such transit time from
three weeks  (exclusive ocean transport) to, say, four days (by air) would
fully  serve  their  actual  or  potential  foreign  trade  partners'
requirements. To achieve  such  target,  more  conventional air transport
equipment51 would suffice.
54.  The constraints  are,  however,  not  limited  to  air transport
equipment but are very real also on the infrastructure side. This applies
to land-side storage facilities at airports, runways, navigation systems,
and physical interfaces between  the  air  and  land transport modes. The
steep increases in air  transport  of  Indian  exports  over the last few
years have  certainly  contributed  to  improved  trade  performance, but
inevitably, these  growth  trends  will  taper  off  rapidly, as capacity
constraints build up.  Much  of  the  recent  efficiency  gains in export
trades is therefore likely to be sacrificed again.
The Entrepot System
55.  Ports:  Since  independence,  there  has  been  a  significant
increase in the number of ports in India. While the country had only four
major ports in 1950,  today  the  international  shipping community has a
48/  In  most  Asian  economies  there  have  been  rapid  increases  in  airborne  exports  and imports.  In
addition,  there  is a  growing trend within the  region to  organize combined  sea-air
shipments.  The premise  behind  this  development  is  that  cargoes  can be  moved  between  origins
and destinations  at half  the  time  of  the 'sea only'  move  but also  at half  the costs  of  the
'air  only'  transport.
49/  Essentially  the same  observations  made in  the context  of  surface  transport  apply.
50/  In  early  1989,  Aeroflot  started  to carry Twenty-foot  ISO  sea containers  on an experimental
basis.  If the  experiment  succeeds, this  arrangement  will represent  a  major revolution  in
multi-modal  container  transport.
51/  For instance,  turbo-prop  driven  airplanes  which  should,  howeve-,  be  designed  to cargo-only
configurations.- 24  -
choice among 10 such ports.52 In addition, there are 139 ports of smaller
scale along the national coastline, which extends over 5,000 km.
Traffic handled during 1988 at India's Major Ports
Port  Total Traffic  Container Traffic
...........  (in  million tons).
Bombay  29.567  3.130
Madras  22.819  0.903
Kandla  16.194  0.335
Visakhapatnam  15.371  C.0iO
Mormuago  13.332  -
Calcutta/Ealdia  12.903  0.620
Cochin  6.802  0.252
New Mangalore  6.107  -
Paradip  5.187  -
Tuticorin  4.146  0.082
Source: Indian Ports Association
56.  These major ports handled about 90 percent of the total national
seaborne cargo throughput.  While  the  total  volume increased from just
over 19 million tons in  1950  to  almost  133  million tons in 1988, the
magnitudes involved are modest by  international standards for an economy
of India's size. 53 This manifestation  serves to stress again the conse-
quences of India's prolonged inward-looking policies in the trade sector.
But now that trade volumes are on an upward trend, the ports have quickly
turned into major impediments to further trade expansion.
57.  In most Indian ports, annual traffic volumes have reached levels
which are  uncomfortably  close  to  capacity  limits. Observed occupancy
ratios at container and  general  cargo  berths  range  between 70 and 90
percent in the major ports.
52/  Once  inaugurated  later in 1989,  Nhava  Sheva  will  be  among  the country's then 11  major
ports.
53/  The annual  incidence of seaborne cargo  in  Shanghai exceeds the co  .-tfve cargo volumes of
all Indian ports.- 25  -
Aggregate  1988 Commodity Volumes versus Handling Capacities54
in India's Major Ports
Commodity  Volume  Handling  Capacity
.......  (in  million tons).
Various  (Containerized)  5.300  4.800
Various  (Breakbulk)  22.350  21.650
Petroleum Products  55.250  67.350
Fertilizers  3.900  12.180
Iron Ore  41.500  35.000
Coal  6.250  10.500
Source: All India Shippers Council
58.  What becomes readily apparent  is  the inescapable fact that the
national port system is  likely  to  collapse  under  the load of growirng
traffic volumes before long. This is  a  high price the economy will face
for the years of voluntary neglect. Looking at the container trades which
have the potential of reaching 25 million tons by 1995, even the addition
of Nhava Sheva in 1989 will  not provide the necessary capacity to handle
these volumes efficiently.55 The  70 percent containerization target that
the Government contemplates for the  8th Five-year Plan, has therefore no
real  basis.  The  consequences  for  national  trade  development become
painfully obvious.
59.  In many  respects,  the  ports  have  been  caught  by surprise.
Containerization,  increasing ship sizes  with complex navigation and deep
draft requirements, growing pressures  by  the trading community but also
by ship operators for faster and  reliable services are all phenomena for
which most of the national ports were totally unprepared. These ports are
stuck with configurations of  sea-  and land-side infrastructure designed
for  ship  and  cargo  movements,  typical  for  seatrade  decades  ago.
Unfortunately,  also  the  regulatory  provisions  for  port services, the
organizational  arrangements  and  -quite  frequently-  the  management
attitudes reflect practices which had their  validity in the past but are
hopelessly  inadequate for meeting  the  requirements of today's trade and
transport  markets.
60.  Thus much of  the  misery  is  self-inflicted. As a conservative
estimate: actual port capacities could be  boosted by at least 35 percent
without  any major investment, if prevailing procedures and practices were
54/  The capacity figures represent a  composite  rating, which takes  into account installations
for ship-shore cargo moves, available  yard  and warehousing space, port internal transport
facilities, as well as interfaces with  inland transport systems.
S5/  The new  installations at Nhava  Sheva,  together  with the expandec  container facilities at
Madras  (which are presently  under construction)  will  increase the total container  handling
capacity  of  the national  port system to somewhere between 12 and 15  -lion  tons.- 26  -
brought more in line  with  modern  port  management concepts. Looking at
container management, for  instance,  there  is  no  compelling reason to
stuff and strip more than 90 percent of the cargo within port perimeters.56
Towering mountains of cargo and containers block preciously limited dock,
yard and warehouse  space.  As  a  result, ships experience excessive pre-
berthing delays and long service times while being loaded or unloaded.
61.  To make matters worse,  port managers frequently pursue policies
and practices which create  havoc  in  ship and cargo movements.5  Cranes
and lifting gear are not efficiently deployed -poor maintenance standards
are another problem-,  and  labor  productivity  is  chronically low. :he
additional costs  caused  by  inefficiencies  in  port container handling
amount to US$ 208 per TEU on average.58
62.  Ports  in  India  are  all  confronted  with  the  meanwhile
internationally pervasive clash between  service mechanization  and labor.
Efficient modern cargo  handling  arrangements  require  a high  degree  of
mechanization, which goes usually against employment objectives. The port
industry, which is one of  the  largest  single  employers in India, is a
classic case. For instance, the Port  of  Bombay and the Dock Labor Board
employ a work force of about  40,000, of which 14,000 are registered dock
workers. Ir.  addition, there  are  workers  employed  in  cargo  handling  by
freight forwarders and shipping agencies,  and by the Food Corporatiorn  of
India. All told there are over 160 categories of employees in the Port of
Bombay. Going by the experience  with successful labor redundancy schemes
in other ports, elsewhere in  the  world,  a  cut  of, say, 50 percent of
Bombay port's  labor  force  would  have  no  negative  effect on overall
performance. In fact, it is most likely that a 'thinning out' of the work
force in Indian ports would entail substantial productivity  improvements.
63.  What angers traders and transport operators alike are abnormally
high port charges, for which  little  justification exist - especially in
the light of poor port  performance.59 Port managers  frequently pursue a
practice  of  cross-subsidizing  inefficient  segments  of  a  port  with
revenues  from  higher  charges  on  other  services.  But  they  do  it
indiscriminately,  and  more  than  often  the  result  is  that services
56/  Which is largely  due to customs  requirements  and other  regulatory  constraints.
57/  In  1984,  a  premature  decision  by  the  Bombay Port  Trust  to  take  over  in-port  movements  of
cargo  with its  own equipment  led  to 18  months  of chaos.
58/  Because  of the low  efficiency  of unionized labor gangs,  most  ship  operators  prefer  to pay
these  gangs  a  fee for leaving  the  site  and  use  their  own staff  -much less  in  number-  to  do
the same  job  at substantially  higher  productivity  rates.
59/  Aggravating  these  circumstances  is  the fact  that  there  are  many  cases  of additional  charges
levied  on port  users,  such  as a  four  percent  octroi  tax in  Bombay.- 27-
important to trade  are  severely  overtaxed.60 For the port managements
this route is  apparently  easier  to  take  than  the cumbersome path of
arranging for improved efficiency among the low-performance elements in a
port.
64.  By far the worst situation exists  in the Port of Bombay61 which
is all the more critical  as  the  Bombay metropolitan  region remains the
principal  commercial  center  of  India.  The  constantly  deteriorating
performance trends in the  port  have induced two important developments.
Firstly, the Port of Kandla -further  up  on the West coast- has become a
major outlet for  exports  from  Northern  India  which are diverted from
Bombay.62 Secondly, there has been  a significant shift of seaborne cargo
flows from the West  coast  to  the  East  coast,  largely because of the
superior services  available  at  the  Port  of  Madras.63 This  port is
presently a  notable  exception  within  the  Indian  port system. Unlike
Bombay, Madras has an aggressive management team, that is willing to take
risks and to launch  unconventional  initiatives,  and a productive labor
force that is less influenced by  union rules. The port's strategic plans
include  integration  with  land  transport  systems,  such  as dedicated
container train services, under  a  special  deal with the railways, that
will  extend into  the  main  production  centers  of Northern and Western
India.64 Several ocean carriers  have  expressed  interest to arrange for
their own  dedicated  container  rail  services.  Since  they  still face
container repositioning problems65 -because  the  number of full import
containers often exceeds  the  number  returning full exports containers-
they plan to  offer  the  returning  'empties'  for  hauling cargoes with
domestic origins and  destinations.  Such  cost-cutting arrangements have
60/  Bombay  still  makes  substantial  surpluses  -mostly from  demurrage.  Much  fear in  anticipation
of similar  developments  exists  with  regard  to  Nhava Sheva  for which  user  charges  have  not
yet been  formulated.
61/  Which  was the principal  reason  for the  Nhava  Sheva  initiative.
62/  The Port  of Kandla  has  registered  significant growth by  improving its  share  in  total
seaborne  cargo  handling  among  Indian ports from  4.9  percent in  1966  to 13.3  percent  in
1988.
63/  In 1985  the split  of national  seaborne cargo flows was  65/35  between  West  and  East  coast
ports,  by 1988  it  had reversed  to 45/56.
64/  Some  discussions  have  been  held  to  establish an  Indian  land  bridge  with  Madras  and  Nhava
Sheva -once  fully  operational-  at  each  end.  Such  arrangements  have  produced  significant
freight  transport  improvements  elsewhere,  particularly in  North  America.  A key requirement
is,  however, that  existing infrastructure  is amenable to  handling modern  transport
equipment,  and  that  all  documentation and  inspection  procedures  are highly  streamlined
-which  is  a  far cry  from  the  present situation  in  India.  Unfortunately  this  observation
applies  also  to  a  new  facility,  like  Nhava  Sheva.
65/  The cost  of repositioning  empty  containers  from  New  Delhi  to Bombay  or  Madras  is  about  USS
145/TEU.- 28  -
been successfully introduced in  North America and Europe. Unfortunately,
Indian Railways often resist such innovative moves.66
65.  In general,  however,  the  national  port  system stands little
chance in the medium  term  of  attracting  mainline  services on a large
scale. 67 Feedering Indian import and  export  trades through the ports of
Colombo, Dubai and  Singapore  will  remain  the organizational setup for
national seaborne  cargo  moves  for  a  considerable  period ahead. This
insight will be hard to accept  for  India's authorities. But it would be
futile in many respects to  o against these trends with regulations which
will ultimately hurt trade.68 Unless  the Indian ports in general improve
their performance dramatically,  there  is  little  hope for inducing the
international ocean carriers to change their present service networks.
66.  An essential prerequisite  for  bringing  the  national ports ir.
line with the requirements of  today's  trade and transport markets, will
be  a  coordinated  national  port  systems  management  and  development
strategy. It is simply not affordable  any  longer to deal with each port
in isolation from other national  ports  and without due consideration of
the changing practices in international trade and transport. The role and
function of each port in the system  have to be redefined in the light of
the changing environments in which these ports are positioned and nave to
perform.69
67.  The Inland  Depot  and  Warehousing  System:  The  only  hope to
relieve  the  hard-pressed  national  ports  and  to  contain  logistics
constraints to continued trade growth is  a system of inland depots where
import and export cargoes are processed  and cleared. Such a system would
enable the ports to shed  many  of  their present capacity limitations by
allowing swift transfers of cargoes which would imply that congested port
space would become available  and  allow  more streamlined cargo handling
operations. Under such  conditions,  the  1.5 million containers forecast
for  1995  could  be  handled  with  relative  efficiency.70 But  the
requirements do not end  here.  Quite  obviously,  there  will have to be
88/  APL operated six dedicated container  trains  between  Madras  and New Delhi in early 1988.
This service had all the makings of success;  it had to be discontinued due to opposition by
the Railways'  operating staff.
67/  The addition  of Nhava Sheva is unlikely to change this situation  in any significant way, as
all  indications point to the  inescapable fact of early congestion.
88/  Proposals  to secure a policy which progressively  reserves 40 percent of the total  container
trade to Indian ships with mainline services  into  and out of national  ports was put on ice
in 1987 due to diverging views among ministries and protests by Indian shippers.
_9/  Importantly,  also  the  Indian  ports  have  to  make  efforts  to  establish  effective
communication  links among each  other  and  with  the  traoe  and transport  industries. EDI
networks are benefitting ports in a substantial way world*de.
70/  Without major  new investments required in ports.- 29  -
well functioning land  transport  arrangements  that ensure unimpeded and
fast movement of containers between the ports and the depot network.
68.  Realizing  the  potential  benefits  of  such  an  approach  the
Government commissioned  Indian  Railways  to  establish Inland Container
Depots  (ICDs) in strategic  locations.  Thus  a  total  of seven ICDs was
brought on stream during the last few years.71 As a concept, the ICDs are
considered as 'dry ports'  which  are  meant  to serve cargo transfer and
distribution functions for their  respective  hinterlands. Taking it from
there, the plan  is  to  devise  a  complementary  or satellite system of
container freight stations  (CFSs)  and  warehouses  which would serve as
centers for cargo consolidation and clearance.
69.  Brilliant as the concept  is,  the maze of prevailing attitudes,
vested interests, outdated  practices  and  regulations  has caused major
setbacks in  the  well  meant  attempts  to  improve  a  largely hopeless
situation. Firstly,  it  is  the  management  of  the  ICDs. While Indian
Railways are officially in  charge,  they have subcontracted the facility
operations to other parties, who  in  turn have subcontracted again other
interests.72 Secondly,  it  is  the  physical  setup  of  the  ICDs. The
structures  and  available  equipment  in  these  facilities  are  very
inadequate.  The  labor  force  is  unmotivated,  and  -overshadowing
everything- the  customs  service  is  simply  appalling.73 Finally, and
possibly the most important drawback, is the very unreliable rail haulage
of containers between ports and  the  ICDs.  This is the prime reason for
the still very low use of  this  system.74 Yet, exporters have to use the
ICDs if they want to ship their cargoes in containers to the ports. There
is  hardly  any  trucking  of  bonded  export  containers.  Sending their
consignments in breakbulk form for stuffing to the CFSs in the ports will
invariably confront  exporters  with  lengthy  delays.  But transshipment
through the ICDs means  in  many  cases  additional costs through double-
handling  and  transport  -particularly  for  exporters  who are located
between the ICDs and the ports.
70.  The truth is that today's ICDs are not functioning in accordance
with  the  concept  of  a  'dry  port'  which  is  supplemented by freight
71/  ICDs  are presently available  in Anaparti, Bangalore, Coimbatore, Guntur, Guwhati, Ludhiana,
and New Delhi.
72/  In the case of the New Delhi ICD, Pragati Maidan, Indian Railways  contracted SCI to run the
facility,  who  in turn contracted a  freight forwarder, who finally contracted a  haulier. The
second contract was  ultimately  discontinued,  and  SCI  is  now  dealing with the haulier
directly.
73/  Compounding these circumstances  is the fact that in several instances, space in the ICDs is
blocked by substantial  numbers of containers filled with unclaimed  or abandoned cargo.
74/  Less than 10 percent of  all  import  and  export  containers are  channeled through the ICD
system.- 30 -
stations. In fact, in  almost  all  situations,  the  ICDs serve as cargo
consolidation and  clearance  centers  -a  role  to  be  fulfilled by the
freight stations. Thus there are presently two parallel systems of inland
warehousing  facilities for export and  import trades, the only difference
is that the ICDs have rail connections. The picture would not be complete
without mentioning the 16 CFSs which  were established and are run by the
railways as service centers for domestically traded commodities which are
shipped in containers.
71.  Warehousing has  a  long  tradition  in  India.  Basically, this
concept was driven by the need to establish facilities in rural areas and
urban centers in order  to  ensure  effective storage and distribution of
essential  commodities.  The  system  is  administered  by  the  Central
Warehousing  Corporation  (CWC), 75 which  is  complemented  by  16 State
Warehousing Corporations  (SWCs). Together,  the  CWC  and the SWCs have a
monopoly in overseeing a network of 1,515 warehouses which are spread a'l
over the country. Gradually and over time some 155 bonded warehouses were
established,76 essentially to  enforce  customs and excise regulations. 77
All these warehouses are  common-user  facilities  but since they are run
under bureaucratic rules, much inefficiency exists -despite the fact that
private operators provide cargo  handling  services  in  most CWC and SWC
facilities. With the tariff increase of  May  1, 1989, the costs of cargo
handling in the CFS system have become excessive.
72.  It was only in 1983  that  the  first  CFS for export and import
trades was established in India -another indication of the country's late
awakening to the  changing  international  trade  and transport scene. In
addition to this facility in Bombay,  there  is  now also a CFS in Madras
and one in New  Delhi.  But  this  is  the  extent  to which it goesl The
extremely limited availability of CFSs explains  why the ICDs are used as
clearance centers. The customs authorities have  a very tight grip on all
these facilities. The situation  is  particularly critical in ports where
the CFSs and bonded warehouses occupy  large tracts of land, and the port
managers have no control over the utilization of these assets.78
73.  With some considerable  reluctance  the authorities have allowed
private bonded warehouses  in the  case  of  a few importers and exporters
that generate entire wagonloads  of  cargo  transported by dedicated unit
7S/  CWC is  under  the  Ministry  of Food  and Civil  Supplies.
78/  Of which  34 are  located  in  ports  and 121  at  inland  locations.
77/  Asserting  its  assigned  role, CWC  was  successful in  changing  practices  which  previously
allowed  customs  officers  to inspect  cargo  at exporters'  premises.
78/  Managers  in the  Port  of  Madras  indicated that  overal  port  productivity  could  be
substantially  increased  if  the CWC  and  Customs  controlled  *a-.rousing  installations  could
be moved outside the  port  perimeters.  As  an  exception  Y  4alras,  some non-contentious
cormodities,  especially  agro-industrial  products  (like onlonc  a  major  export  to  Southeast
Asia)  and seafood  can be  stuffed  into  containers  outside  the  ort- 31  -
trains.79 But this an exception rather than  a rule, and in any case, the
beneficiaries of such exceptions have to make many special arrangements80
to satisfy the responsible authorities. Furthermore, these rules apply to
FCLs only. LCL cargoes have to be handled in public warehouses.
74.  Since more  and  more  mid-size  and  even smaller manufacturers
enter the export market, there is an increasing demand to cater for their
special  requirements.  Because  these  firms  produce  relatively  small
quantities which often are  less  than  container loads (LCLs), and since
there is the already reported requirement among foreign importers to ship
full container loads (FCLs), consolidation  services are needed. But many
of the smaller firms also do  not have sufficient storage space and -even
more importantly- do not have access  to EDI links, which makes them turn
to providers of such services. As  a result, there is a rapidly spreading
network in India of  privately-run  warehouses  with EDI links that cater
for these special requirements.  But  all this happens completely outside
the official  warehousing  hierarchy,  and  the  authorities  insist that
cargoes  handled  in  the  private  facilities  are  ultimately channeled
through the public system.
75.  The  public  administration  is  now  trying  to  arrange  for
streamlining this unwieldy system  and  to extend the geographic coverage
of ICDs, CFSs and  bonded  warehouses.  A  target under the 8th Five-year
Plan is  to  establish  a  network  of  11  ICDs  and  15  satellite CFSs
throughout the country.81 Among these will be one of the world's largest
'dry ports' capable of handling 300,000 containers by the year 2000.81 It
is being constructed at Tughlakabad  near  New  Delhi. But judging by the
limited progress made to  date  with  installing  this facility, there is
justified  reason  for  having  doubts  about  the  feasibility of these
ambitious plans.83 Better  orchestration  of  the arrangements for plan
implementation is required.
76.  To  ensure  such  coordination,  the  Government  acted  upon  a
recommendation by  the  Railway  Reforms  Committee  in  1986, and passed
legislation  for  establishing  a  central  body  responsible  for inland
container transport and handling. As  a result, the Container Corporation
of India  (CONCOR)  was created. But  it took almost three years for CONCOR
79/  The national  branch  of  the XEROX  Corporation  in  Northern  India  is  an  example.
80/  Such  as  paying  -2.5  times  the salary-  and accommodating  customs  inspectors.
81/  This  system  is  to be  expanded  to 21  ICDs  and 57 CFSs  by the  year  2000.
82/  Which  would  represent  a  gargantuan  leap  forward,  considering  that  the currently  largest  ICD
-the  one in  New Delhi-  has  a design  capacity  of S00  TEU per month,  although  26,000  TEU  were
handled  in  1988.
83/  Early  availability  of  the Tughlakabad  ICD  will  be crucial  fo-  the  success  of  Nhava  Sheva  in
efficiently  catering for the  rapidly increasing container 
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to become a functioning  entity.84 CONCOR's budgetary allocations are 13
crores of Rupees for 1989, which  would  be additional to the 5 crores of
Rupees which the Corporation  presently  holds.  A  decision was taken to
place CONCOR  under  the  auspices  of  the  Ministry  of  Railways. Much
infighting has taken place over filling the management positions, and the
lower ranks remain largely  to  be  staffed.  Therefcre, how long will it
take for CONCOR to become  truly  effective? Are the budgetary provisions
sufficient  in  view  of  the  ambitious  ICD  development  program?  And
furthermore, was it a good decision  to place an agency which should have
an unbiased  multi-modal  orientation  under  the  railways? Already now,
there are complaints  from  the  trading  and  transport communities that
CONCOR will not  have  user  representation  on  its board. Instead, only
Government offices will be included.  Will CONCOR thus have the necessary
commercial outlook and be  able  to  deal  with  the special market needs
effectively? CONCOR still has to  finalize  its corporate plan and devise
its modus operandi, but there are already too many uncomfortable cuestion
marks. A situation which  is  not necessarily instilling confidence among
those elements of the national  econcmy  that  are heavily counted on for
improving India's trade performance.
The Cargo Management  Services
77.  The Shipping Agents: Possibly the most innovative element in the
entire framework of  trade  logistics  in  India  is  the  local agent of
foreign carriers. As  foreign  transport  enterprises  are not allowed to
have branch offices in the country,  they rely on contracted local agents
to organize efficient arrangements for serving the logistics needs of the
trading community. The fact that  over  60 percent of India's exports are
on f.o.b. terms really  means  that decisions over transport arrangements
are made outside India to  a  considerable  extent.  It is then the local
agent  who  has  to  follow  up  from  there  and  ensure  that logistics
arrangements are made which meet the tightly scheduled service provisions
by his employer -in most  cases  a reputable international ocean carrier-
whose service  organization  is,  in  turn,  shaped  by the international
shippers'  special  requirements.  And,  indeed,  under  the  competitive
pressures of these external market forces,  the local agents have been in
the forefront of introducing  innovative  logistics arrangements in India
-to the extent the system allowed  them to do so.85 Without these agents,
the trade logistics management  situation  in  the  country would be much
worse than it actually is.
84/  According  to the latest  information,  CONCOR  will  be functional  by  June  1989.
85/  Possibly  most helpful  was the freedom foreign  operators  enjoy  in  arranging  for multi-modal
transport  and related  combined  transport  documents,  which  their  Indian  counterparts  can  not
do under  present  legislative  provisions.- 33 -
78.  But the agents' and  ultimately their foreign employers' success
bred envy among  the  less  fortunate  domestic operators. Allegations of
overcharging for services and of schemes  for capital flight emerged as a
manifestation of the 'losers' frustrations  over their inability to be as
efficient  as  their  foreign  competition.  There  have  been occasional
suggestions -and presently much  discussion  is held within various local
circles- to curtail  the  agents'  freedom  to  maneuver. Considering the
current largely  ineffective  logistics  setup,  such  a  move would have
catastrophic  consequences  for  trade  -a  high  price  to  pay  for the
protection of less efficient domestic operators.
79.  While such conclusion is beyond dispute,  it is at the same time
fair to say that the domestic operator is at a considerable disadvantage.
Not  only  is  he  constrained  in  organizing  multi-modal  transport
arrangements and has no right  to  issue combined transport documents -he
can also not deal with the shipper directly because Indian law requires a
customs house agent  as  intermediary  between shipper and transporter.86
The question  then  is:  do  all  these  existing  constraints not unduly
curtail the development of  a  competitive Indian trade logistics service
industry? And, given  a  chance,  could  Indian operators develop service
arrangements which  would  seriously  challenge  the foreign competition?
Without  any doubt, the answer would be positivel
80.  The Freight forwarders: This  is an international business which
has also in India a long  tradition.87 But Indian freight forwarders have
always been rather  small  untertakings.88 Accordingly  is their public
image, and  most  Government  officials  still  talk about 'fly-by-night'
entrepreneurs.  There  is  little  confidence  in  their  activities and,
indeed, in their seriousness as  far  as business conduct is concerned.89
While there may have been  justification  for many of these sentiments in
the past -and possibly  also  in  some  isolated  cases today- the Indian
freight forwarding profession has come  a  long  way. For instance, it is
the  local  freight  forwarder  who  organizes  'groupage'  of  small
86/  Which  also  applies  to  foreign operators but  usually their  local  agents  hold  a  customs
broker  license,  and  thus  direct  shipper-transporter  contacts  are possible.
87/  There are  as many  as  700  organizations in  India engaged  in  the business  of clearing  and
forwarding.
88/  They  usually  had  their  beginning  as  customs house  agents,  who have  increasingly  converted
into  CLF agents  providing  services  to  clear imports  and  to forward  exports.
89/  Not surprisingly,  the insurance  industry  and  the banking  sector  therefore  consider  freight
forwarding  in India  as a  high  risk  business, and they  are  usually  very  reluctant  to cover
liabilities  associated  with  these activities. Also, the  debate  over  the right  of local
freight  forwarders  to issue  combined transport documents  is  heavily  overshadowed  by fears
of  potential  fraud  and capital  flight.- 34 -
consignments90 and  communications  links  for  the  lower  end  of  the
production sector. It is  also  the  freight  forwarder who has been very
instrumental in organizing transport  of domestically traded commodities.
Furthermore, with  their  knowledge  of  local  conditions and practices,
several Indian freight forwarders have  been able to lift the performance
under some services above the norms  for similar services provided by the
foreign shipping community.91
81.  The more aggressive among the  Indian freight forwarders aim now
at a new market niche,  which  their foreign counterparts have penetrated
so effectively in their own countries. Reference is made here to the Non-
Vessel-Owning-Common-Carrier  (NVOCC).  When  freight  forwarders  can be
considered as retailers, the NVOCC is a wholesaler who deals with another
wholesaler, namely the ocean  carrier.  NVOCCs  can build up considerable
bargaining power vis-a-vis the  carriers  by amassing large quantities of
cargo from different sources  and  auctioning  these off on the transport
market. Carriers dread such  developments  as they usually entail massive
freight  rate  deterioration.  Thus  a  local  NVOCC  community  would be
extremely beneficial for India's  trade.  The  sad fact is, however, that
the current regulatory environment does  not  make  it easy for a freight
forwarder to turn NVOCC.92 And,  as  can  be expected, the international
carrier lobby does everything possible to maintain the status quo.93
82.  The Shippers: There are some shippers in India who, by virtue of
the substantial volumes of  commodities  they  produce, have set up their
own logistics organizations.  Furthermore,  the  ten large trading houses
that exist in the country act as 'super freight forwarders' in many ways.
In addition to  their  own  products,  they  buy commodities from smaller
manufacturers  and subsequently market these under their own arrangements.94
Their influence on the logistics  scene is indeed formidable -considering
that a group like  TATA  Industries  stands  behind  25  to 30 percent of
Indian exports.
90/  But the legal  provision  which  makes it  impossible  for  Indian  freight  forwarders  to  operate
bonded  warehouses  undermines  much  of  the gains  achieved  through  groupage.
91/  As of late,  some  local  freight  forwarders  have  managed  to stuff  30 cu.m.  of garment  into  a
Twenty-foot  container,  while  23-2S  cu.m.  is  the norm  for most  shipping  lines.
92/  In addition to  constraints like rostrictions  on  the  issuance of  combined  transport
documents  and comprehensive liability  coverage, the  Government  also  requires  relatively
heavy  cash  flow  and  equity  criteria  to  be  met by  freight  forwarders  who intend  to venture
into  the NVOCC  business.
93/  As an exception,  Indian and  Soviet  interests have  recently  established  a  joint  freight
forwarding  group  -INDSOTRA-  that  will  organize  cargo  movements  between  these  two countries.
94/  To illustrate  this  point:  Hindustanlever  -a  joint  venture  of  Unilever  and local  interests-
is in  the  market  with  S0 percent  of  its own products,  while  the other  50 percent  of  their
activities  are related  to merchandise  acquired  from  other  parties.- 35 -
83.  But possibly more than  in  the  foreign trade sector, the self-
organized Indian shippers are most  actively involved in domestic trades.
They are running vast systems  of  their own warehouses which are located
as  entrepots  between  their  production  and  consumption  centers.95
Following the  successful  reorganization  of  inventory management among
their foreign counterparts, Indian traders  have now initiated efforts to
reduce stocks -which in turn  will  result in less capital commitments.96
Obviously, transport is an  important  element  of such system management
organization. Most of the  large  shippers  used  to  rely heavily on the
railways  for  hauling  their  merchandise  between  the  production  and
consumption centers. Until recently, up to 30 percent of these moves took
place by rail. Today,  this  percentage  has  declined  to just over five
percent, and most haulage is done through trucking services.97
84.  There is a  strong  demand  among  the  large shipper groups for
container transport in the domestic market. Today, less than five percent
of  domestically  traded  commodities  is  moved  containerized.  The key
constraint  is shortage of  containers,  a  problem  which is said to rest
entirely with the railways.  Shippers  indicate  that they are willing to
guarantee annual cargo  volumes  against  an  undertaking  to provide the
required container  capacity.  The  question  then  is:  can the railways
organize such a system,  or  even  should  they?  Much discussion goes on
about container leasing and the  establishment of a corresponding leasing
industry. Going by the  experience  in other countries, such arrangements
would serve to largely overcome  existing capacity constraints. There are
also several entrepreneurs in India who  would be willing to venture into
such business.  But  those  who  presently  hold  the  monopolies in this
sector, such as the railways  and  SCI, appear to have little inclination
to go along with this  proposal  by Indian business circles. Furthermore,
there are deeply rooted fears in some public administration circles about
the alleged potential  for  tax  evasion  and  capital flight, if leasing
through private sector initiatives would develop on a larger scale.
85.  Looking back at all the points  made in this chapter, it becomes
easily apparent that trade  logistics  arrangements  in India are under a
dark cloud. With all the  innovations  in cargo management that have been
progressively  instituted  in  the  international  trade  and  transport
markets,  India's economy now  faces  serious  threats because the country
has not  followed  these  international  developments  at  the same pace.
Instead, the local trade  logistics  system  continues  to be bogged down
95/  A typical  setup  comprises  50 production  facilities  and 500  targeted  consumption  centers,  as
in  the case  of  Hindustanlever.
96/  Their  target  is  to run inventories  on  the  basis  of a turnover  of  seven  days;  presently  the
average  is  30 days.
97/  Apparently,  the railways  have  become  nervous about these  trends,  and one shipper  reported
that  they  were  able  to sign  a  service contract  with  the railways.  Under  this  contract,  the
railways  undertook  to provide  scheduled dedicated service every  six days  -a promise  that
was  largely  kept-  against  the shipper's  guarantee  to provide  a minimum  of  260 tons  of  cargo
per  month.- 36 -
through a  whole  series  of  true  or  imagined  concerns among national
private or public sector  groups.  Certainly,  national values and policy
objectives are vital elements  of  economic  and social strategies, but a
clearer perception of who benefits from what is dearly needed. Presently,
it appears as if India's trade  sector is expected to make sacrifices for
the sake of  sustaining  a  rather  derelict  national  freight, and more
specifically container transport system.  The  question  then is: what is
more important for the economy in  the  longer run -promotion of trade or
maintenance of an outmoded logistics service sector?
VI.  THE  PUBLIC  ADMINISTRATION  AND  TRADE  LOGISTICS  MANAGEMENT
86.  As in the case  of  the  local  trade and transport circles, the
Indian public administratior.  was caught by surprise when containerization
started to penetrate domestic  markets  at steadily increasing rates. The
central planners had initially  regarded  containerization as a state-cf-
the-art development which would  only  happen  very  slowly in India, and
consequently did not take the concept very seriously. Container terminals
in ports, and container transport by  rail were not even discussed in the
same breadth until 1985,  at  the  start  of  the current Five-year Plan.
During interviews, members of the Planning Commission -the Five-year Plan
think tank- stated  that  perceptions  of containerization were genuinely
very mixed until recently. Most of India's exporting textile, engineering
and assembly industries were still based around the major ports. The ICDs
and flatcar fleets in  which  the  railways  had invested during the early
1980s spent the first  years  of  their  lives heavily underutilized. The
boom in inland container cargo  has  only  come  in the last two or three
years, and before that containerization was just not considered viable as
a national goal.
87.  The  centrally  planned  economy  is  usually  justified  on the
grounds that India has to  develop  with  slender means. Things cannot be
left to the markets  because  India  is huge, undercapitalized  and cannot
afford any waste. However, the public administration's way of going about
this  through  state  enterprises  and  bureaucratic  policing  of  other
businesses also  creates  an  economy  strong  in choosing macro-economic
directions for itself, but  often  weak  in  its attempts to manage micro
systems further dowr..  The impact  of  a  new technology from the outside,
like containerization, provides  a  classic  example  of  how this system
works -and where it does not. In a decision-making system that is heavily
overcentralized,  the lack of lead  from  the top on containerization  sent
out the wrong messages  to  the  heavily  compartmentalized bottom of the
pyramid.
88.  Functional agencies, like  ports,  railways, shipping lines, and
customs were all left separately to deal with the containers that arrived
in increasing numbers each  year.  In  effect, all these agencies pursued
arrangements on  an  interim  basis  by  fitting  containers around their
existing operations. With  some  notable  exceptions,  they did little to
adapt their own organizations to  the  new technology, and ^ade even less- 37  -
effort to coordinate on container  matters  with other agencies. And left
to their own devices,  a  new  cargo  system like containerization easily
ended up  against  traditional  bureaucratic  boundaries, with  individual
container movements  left waiting  on outdated procedures designed decades
ago around conventional cargo. This  process has repeated itself over and
over again,  from  the  top  of  the  bureaucracy  downwards,  and across
individual modes -each making  minimum  concessions to container traffic.
It happened this way because  entities  like the older ports were waiting
for new developments and never  saw  themselves  as part of a strategy on
container transport, or because  organizations  like  customs will not do
very much without seeing detailed  changes  in their rulebooks first. But
with container  traffic  now  starting  to  arrive  in  much more serious
numbers, the legacy of  piecemeal  containerization means that the system
is completely ill-equipped to take  much further expansion. Major reforms
are called forl
89.  If the number of  trade  and  transport industry associations is
overwhelming,98 almost the same can  be said about the central government
agencies that hold responsibilities  -directly or indirectly- for matters
related to  trade  logistics  management.  There  are  nine ministries,99
seven special authorities, and numerous  committees which are mandated to
pursue the different aspects of trade logistics. In addition, the Reserve
Bank of India  (RBI)  and  the  Foreign  Exchange Dealers' Association of
India (FEDAI) -in essence the commercial  banking sector-, as well as the
Government-run  insurance  industry  play  major  roles  in  this respect.
Furthermore,  there is a whole  network  of regulatory bodies at the state
and municipal levels  which  exert  their  influence  over the conduct of
trade logistics services.  Finally,  there  are  the public corporations,
like the port trusts and the state-owned carriers, that add measurably to
this long list. All  things  considered,  one  easily arrives at a number
exceeding 150 when  adding  up  all  the  different public administration
bodies that control India's trade logistics network.
90.  Even  now  that  public  awareness  of  the  rapidly  expanding
container market and its  challenge  for  India's  trade is growing, only
limited  initiatives  have  yet  been  taken  to  facilitate  container
penetration  in  the  domestic  market.  And  these  few  initiatives have
largely run up  against  major  obstacles.  Possibly  the most cumbersome
impediments are present legislative  provisions.  There are dozens of so-
called acts that  regulate  the  conduct  of  trade  and  related tax and
foreign exchange control  aspects,  the  provision of transport services,
and the management  of  transport  infrastructure.  But these regulations
have generally not been  adjusted  in  line  with the developments in the
trade  and  transport  markets  which  have  driven  major  restructuring
-including  legislative reforms-  of  these  networks  in other economies.
Going by the experience elsewhere,  it  becomes clear that these are very
98/  There  are some  60 shippers councils and  trade  associations,  and several  dozen  groupings
which represent  the  transport  and  freight  forwarding  industries  ;r  India.
99/  The Ministries  of Commerce, Communications,  Finance, Food  and  Supplies,  Industry,  Labor,
Planning,  Railways,  and Surface  Transport.- 38  -
time  consuming  processes.100 Most  importantly,  however,  the  more
successful cases demonstrate the instrumental  role played by the private
sector in  these  efforts.  The  exporters  and  importers,  as  well the
transport  industries  in  these  countries  could  take  measures  which
improved their efficiency  -and  thus  their  competitive stance- because
their governments had established a liberal framework in  which they could
effectively adjust to changing market conditions.
91.  The Indian public  administration  has  the  habit of setting up
special committees when it comes to establishing a framework for reforms.
These committees usually  draw  on  the  best  expertise available in the
country, and include seasoned  public officials. Participation of private
sector representatives  is  customarily  limited  to  advisory roles. But
these committees -as far  as  they  relate  to  trade and transport- have
generally a rather  narrow  focus.  They  usually concentrate on isolated
issues, such as port reforms, revival  of coastal shipping and the future
development of the Indian fleet. Consequently, their deliberations do not
include broader market  perspectives  and  -very  crucially- the changing
international environments in which  Indian  trade  and transport have to
perform.101
92.  It is a hard reality for every country -for that matter also for
India- that international trade  and  transport  markets have become very
closely integrated  and  keep  undergoing  dramatic  restructuring, which
imposes  stringent  adjustment  requirements  on  any  nation  which  has
ambitions to improve its  trade  performance  in  today's market.  In this
context, the inevitable fact that  outside forces dictate trade logistics
arrangements in line with  their  own initiatives to improve competitive-
ness, has to  be  accepted  -for  better  or  worse. Without meeting such
requirements, a country  will  increasingly  run  a  danger of losing its
contact with the trade markets.  And  this  situation is very real in the
case of India.
93.  What makes the whole process so unwieldy are the often diverging
objectives and  views  held  by  different  line  agencies  in the public
sector. An  almost  typical  example  exists  between  the  Ministries of
Commerce and Finance -one party wants to facilitate the conduct of trade,
and the other is keen on controlling  trade and on tapping trade as major
revenue source to the extent possible. This goes back to India's policies
of protectionism  and  self-sufficiency,  where  restricting  imports and
checking foreign exchange outflows was  far  more important a job for the
public administration  than facilitating trade. Collecting duty was as big
a source of income  for  the  Government  as  revenues from export sales.
Consequently,  customs  -a  wing  of  the  Ministry  of  Finance-  have
100/  The  U.S.  Shipping  Act of 1984, which  has  generated substantial  gains  in  the conduct  of
trade related  transport,  was 12  years  before  the legislature  until it  could  be ratified.
101/  An exception  was the  Rajwar  Committee on  Indian Shipping which  took  a b-oader  market
perspective,  but  the committee's main  concern was  how  the  share  of  the  national  flag
carriers  in  international  trade  could  be  enhanced  -and  not how Indian  trade logistics  could
be improved.- 39  -
traditionally worked  independently of trade, more than often oblivious to
the fact that trade  has  to  be  moved.  But  in an economy where almost
everything still has  to have  a  specific ruling or dispensation, fitting
in  with the requirements for smooth trade flows has often determined what
transport systems can and  cannot  do. Obviously, the bureaucratic delays
hit  a  new  and  cost-intensive  system  of  trade  logistics,  like
containerization, worse than most.  But even within particular ministries
there are divergent  views.  For  instance,  in  the  Ministry of Surface
Transport,  the port and shipping wings do  not see eye to eye because one
wants to encourage liberalization of  the cabotage trades (ports) and the
other promotes maintenance of the status quo (shipping). 102
94.  Clearly, in a  populous  country  like  India, employment issues
loom large. Labor-intensive options in trade logistics management will be
practicable only in  cases  where  they  do  not  interfere with the user
requirements of efficient cargo packaging, handling and transport. If the
Indian trade logistics network is to  be improved, there is not much hope
that transport services and infrastructure  will be able to sustain their
traditionally  large workforce. But here is where the hard choices have to
be made between economic and social development objectives. This issue is
real in India, and it  is  not surprising that substantial differences of
opinion exist in this respect between the Ministry of Labor and the other
line agencies. The attitudes and lobbying  power of the labor unions only
add to these already difficult circumstances.
95.  Despite this rather gloomy situation, some affirmative action is
taking place -if still on the margin. A national information center (NIC)
was established by the Ministry  of  Commerce. NIC is meant to ultimately
serve the intelligence needs of trade and transport -much action is still
necessary  to get it there.  EDI  network planning was started in February
1989 under the auspices of the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports. A
special group has been  formed  in  the  Prime Minister's  office to study
ways and means for establishing effective electronic networking  in India.
96.  Possibly the most important  initiative  for the trade logistics
sector was taken under the leadership of RBI.103 Together with  represen-
tatives  of  FEDAI,  the  Ministry  of  Surface  Transport,  the  General
Insurance Corporation of India, and the national ocean shipping industry,
RBI set out to devise  a  plan  for establishing a framework for combined
102/  This issue  arose  over  the continuing  trend  among  international  ocean  carriers  to  serve  the
Indian  market  through  feeder  services  out  of  the load  centers  Singapore,  Colombo  or  Dubai
The national  port  community  believes  that  by  allowing  foreign  carriers  to  organize  coastal
feeder  services,  Indian  load  centers  would  emerge  in Bombay  (or  Nhava  Sheva)  for  the West
coast  and Madras  for the  East  coast. At  the  same  time,  dwindllng  traffic  at  the other
Indian  ports  would  be revitalized.  In  contrast, the national  flag  carriers  fear  that  such
move  would  further  erode  their  already  fragile  stance  in  the seatrade  market.
103/  The Srinivasan  Committee.- 40  -
transport documentsl04 to  facilitate multi-modal transport arrangements
-which is one of  the  key  prerequisites for effective container trades.
The intention is to make such  arrangements easier to institute by Indian
shippers and  carriers.105 This  task  was  extremely  onerous  as all
existing  relevant  legislation  with  regard  to  liabilities,  taxes
applicable to trade and transport, foreign exchange regulations, carriage
and  sale  of  goods  had  to  be  vetted  for  required  amendments. The
deliberations  resulted  in  a  proposal  for  a  (Multi-modal)  Combined
Transport of Goods Act. To make it work, substantial changes will have to
be effected in several existing laws that govern the conduct of trade and
transport. Unfortunately, the proposed  act  has  been before the cabinet
for almost two years, without any  affirmative action taken yet. This and
other similar cases  seem  to  demonstrate  how  difficult  it is for the
Indian public administration to face  up to today's market realities, and
to take corrective measures -in the best interest of the economy.
97.  The  bottom  line  is  that  the  public  administration  has to
reconsider national priorities and  objectives  in  light of the changing
environments -and  notably  practices-  in  the  international  trade and
transport markets. If India wants to catch up with, if not outperform its
trade  competitors,  then  there  is  no  alternative  to  substantial
reorganization of its  trade  logistics  system.  Of possibly even higher
importance is the need to generate enough foreign exchange income through
improved trade performance, which is  required  to ease the transition of
the Indian nation into a  modern  economy based on effective technologies
and production as well as  distribution processes. This would also reduce
the country's vulnerability to  shocks  in  the international economy. At
the same time, economic and  social  services on the domestic scene could
be more efficiently provided.
98.  Questions that are likely to  feature prominently in this debate
include:
A  To  what  extent  should  the  public  sector remain
involved  in  the  management  of  trade  logistics
networks7
*  How much can the  rules  and regulations that govern
the  conduct  of  trade  logistics,  and  their
enforcement be relaxed?
104/  Which  were  drafted in  conformity with  standardized  forms  issued  by  the International
Chamber of  Commerce  and  the International  Federation  of Freight  Forwarders  Associations.
105/ A major  drawback  was  that  the  national freight forwarders were not  involved,  and the
proposals  elaborated  by  the Committee  reflect  little,  if  anything,  to  improve the  role  and
function  of  Indian  forwarders  in  trade logistics  management.- 41  -
*  Should  public  corporations  that  provide  trade
related warehousing  and  transport services be given
more  autonomy  and  basically  be  organized  on
commercial principles?
*  Should private market  forces  be  permitted to take
over a  more  substantial  share  in trade logistics
service functions?
*  Can the experience  with  related system adjustments
in  other  countries  provide  guidance  for  trade
logistics reforms in India?
*  Which  options  could  be  considered  to  contain
employment issues that are likely to result from the
required mechanization of logistics arrangements?
*  What are the  trade  offs between transport industry
protection and trade performance, and to what extent
should the  national  transport industry, especially
ocean shipping, remain protected?
*  How could the organization  of planning and managing
the national trade logistics system be improved?
*  Which  interventions  are  required,  how  will they
affect the  provision  of  trade logistics services,
what  is  their  scope,  and  how  should  they  be
sequenced?
*  How much investment  is  required,  and  what  is the
likely incidence of annual current costs?
and finally
*  What  options  could  be  considered  for  financing
expected capital and current costs?
VII. THE FINANCIAL DIMENSION
99.  It is extremely difficult,  if  not impossible, to determine the
true capital requirements for developing and operating an efficient trade
logistics system in India. The difficulty  lies  in the fact that most of
the existing transport, warehousing  and communication  facilities are not
utilized  to  their  full  capacity  potential.  Regulatory  constraints,
ineffectual management  and  burdensome  labor  rules  are  the principal
reasons. The case was made  about  the national port system. Productivity
of existing assets could be boosted  around 35 percent if port operations
would be brought more in line  with management practices which are common
in the more successful terminals  elsewhere in the worl.  wviously,  such- 42  -
possible productivity gains  would  serve  to reduce perceived investment
needs on a major scale. The  same observation applies to warehousing, and
-to a considerable extent- to the  railways. The situation in the highway
sector is substantially different because of the technical limitations of
most roads, and shortage  of  special  trucking equipment. Similarly, the
communications  sector  is  critically  limited  in  its  capacity  tc
accommodate the growing electronic  networking  requirements of trade and
transport.
100.  A consolidated assessment of  all  perceived investment needs in
the trade logistics  sector  does  not  exist.  Such need assessments are
presently rather fragmentary; they  are  the  outcome of deliberations by
the various committees, established to  study issues in  different sectors
of the national trade logistics system.
Estimated Canital Investment Requirements until the Year 2000
in different segments of the Indian Trade Logistics System
Sector  Investment Needs106
(US$, billion)
Ocean Shipping  6.13
Coastal Shipping  1.82
Ports  2.50
Railways
Track and Facilities  4.60
Rolling Stock  2.20
Highways  6.40
Trucking Industry  1.50*
Aviation
Cargo Carriers  3.50*
Airports  2.05*
Warehousing  (ICDs/CFSs)  0.75
Communication Networks  0.55*
Total  32.00
(Note:  April  1989  costs,  inflated  to  cover  the  period  under
consideration.)
101.  The above estimates are based  on  the assumption that the modal
shares  in  container  transport  will  not  change  significantly,  i.e.
railways remain the principal mode for land transport. It is. however, by
no means clear  that  such  arrangement  would  yield  the lowest overall
investment package -and maximum  service efficiency. Consequently, it has
to be recognized and accepted that under these present circumstances, any
investment to establish new  or  expanded  cargo handling, warehousing  or
transport facilities is not certain  to  yield optimal benefits. Not on y
106/  Essentially  to cater  for container  trades.  Estimates  by d;fferent  committees,  supplemented
by  Bank  estimates  (identified  by an  asterisk).- 43 -
will the utilization of such  physical  assets be dampened because of the
prevailing operational constraints, it is also not assured that the modal
choice coincides with market preferences.
VIII. AN AGENDA FOR REFORM
102.  First and foremost, the  country  needs a strategy for adjusting
its logistics system to the  changing environments in international trade
and transport markets. The container will  be central to such a strategy.
At the same time,  a  plan  has  to  be  developed which will provide for
necessary  system  adaptations  so  that  the  efficiency  potential  of
containerization can also be tapped for improving the domestic trades. To
achieve this, two of the  presently existing shortcomings in this context
have to be rectified. Firstly, it  is the high degree of fragmentation in
the public administration with  regard  to  systems planning, control and
management.  Secondly, it is the limited involvement of the private sector
in problem assessments and decision-making as regards the development and
management of trade logistics networks.
103.  Given the urgency of  required  system  adjustments in line with
market demands,  a  joint  public-private  sector  task  force  should be
appointed to establish an agenda  for  market surveys and system analyses
which will identify shortcomings  and  improvement  needs. Taking it from
there, the task force should formulate an action plan aimed at correcting
existing constraints and streamlining processes related to cargo handling
and transport. This group  should  be  organized  along  the lines of the
Simplification of International  Trade  Procedures  Boards (SITPRO) which
have been established by many governments107 to spearhead trade logistics
system adjustment programs. There have  been  attempts in India to follow
this route, and  a  body  called  INDPRO  was  established  some time ago.
TNDPRO's  self-proclaimed  objective  is  'to  act  as  freight/trade
facilitation  organization  dealing  with  the  rationalization  and
modernization  of  international  trade  procedures  in  India,  and  the
development of electronic  data  processing  techniques'.  But INDPRO has
been ineffectual, largely  because  support  by the public administration
was lacking. To  succeed  in  any  effort  to  improve trade logistics in
India,  the  full  and unequivocal  commitment and support of the Government
will be needed. This should be  one of the highest priorities in managing
the national economyl
104.  Following  the  establishment  of  a  national  trade  logistics
management  strategy, the role and function  of each element in the system
should be defined. Based on such definition, strategic plans will have to
be formulated for the  development  and  management  of each subsystem, as
they relate to the provision  of  trade logistics services -the shipping,
railway, road  and  air  transport  sectors,  as  well  as  the  port and
107/  Great  Britain  was the  first  country to  take  these  steps,  most  other  European  countries
have  followed,  but also  developing countries have  been  sJccessful  in  taking  this route
(e.g.  Sri Lanka).- 44  -
warehousing systems.108 There  has  to  be  a harmonized decision-making
framework -derived from assessments of comparative advantage- for planned
investments  in  individual  elements  of  the  national  trade logistics
network. Furthermore, and in line  with the assigned roles and functions,
the organizational and  staffing  setup  for  each  subsystem  have to be
reconsidered -and redefined, if necessary.  The piecemeal approach of the
past has clearly demonstrated  its  failure  to effect improvements. More
autonomy is needed for  the  public  entities,  who should be required to
provide their services  on  a  commercial  basis  in  the context of well
defined  corporate  plans.  Ultimately,  the  market  should  judge their
utility, not the public administration. They  should be given a degree of
latitude  that  enables  them  to  shed  burdens,  like  abandoned cargo.
Furthermore, the import duty  impositions  for vitally required equipment
and spares  should  be  lifted  -at  least  they  should be significantly
reduced.
105.  Hand in hand with the  formulation of development and management
strategies for the  individual  elements  of  the trade logistics system,
there will have to be a program that addresses the regulatory and control
net that is cast over  the  entire  system and strangles its performance.
Clearly, customs ranks  on  top.  And  again,  much  can  be derived from
successful initiatives in other  countries,  such  as the introduction oft
the  Customs  Single  Administration  Document.  The  proposed  Combined
Transport Document should  be  ratified  without  any  further delay, and
required amendments to existing regulations  that apply to the conduct of
trade logistics services should be  implemented with highest priority. It
should be understood that little,  if  anything, can be expected in terms
of system performance  improvements  without  removal of these regulatory
and control constraints.
106.  Very  important  in  all  these  considerations  is  the private
sector. Constraints that inhibit  initiatives  should be removed, as much
can be gained for the national  economy by leaving the market forces room
to maneuver.  In  particular  the  national  freight  forwarding industry
should be given more encouragement -together with the required relaxation
of regulations that govern this business.  In their drive to venture into
NVOCC activities, the  national  freight  forwarders  can  be expected to
generate substantial performance improvements for Indian trade.
107.  With  regard to  capital  requirements,  the  Government would be
well advised to seriously  consider  partnerships with private interests.
Most enterprises  involved  in  trade  logistics  service  in India, have
indicated their preparedness to  invest  in  facilities,  if there were a
more liberal framework  in  which  they  could  make  their marketing and
service arrangements. Of  particular  importance  in  this context is the
concept of equipment leasing, which  can extend from containers over port
108/  As was demonstrated earlier, there  is  a  need  to  get  away  from  dealing  with  modal
development schemes in  isolation  -as in  the  case of  ports.- 45  -
or warehouse handling gear to  rolling  stock on rail or road.109 Another
concept of substantial  attractiveness  is  the privatization of facility
operations, such as container terminals in ports.11 0 In many neighboring
countries, such as Malaysia,  substantial  efficiency gains were achieved
through privatization. In fact, discussions  along these lines have taken
place in many circles of the Indian logistics network in the recent past.
The impression is  that  if  privatization  means  greater efficiency and
productivity, then a privately operated  facility is likely to prove more
attractive to traders and carriers  than  one  that is bogged down in red
tape. Also, if privatization  involves large, highly integrated corporate
structures, large firms or  multi-nationals,  then  it is probable that a
facility will be  developed  with  strong  links into efficient logistics
networks. Thus the opportunity  with  privatization is the development of
new  and  efficient  facilities  which  would  ultimately  improve  trade
performance.
108.  It should be clear from all the observations made in this report
that India finds itself at  a  critical cross-road. The outside world has
gone through fundamental changes in  trade management, while the national
economy has fallen behind in trying to keep up with these developments. A
large population, limited resources  and  the  need  to spur economic and
social development on  a  broad  basis  have constrained the Government's
ability to arrange for  effective  adjustments to the rapidly progressing
advances in trade and transport markets.  The time has come to take stock
and to readjust  if  national  economic  development  is  to continue its
upward trend. But fundamental questions  loom large over the advisability
of continuing with practices that appear to lose their relevance -and, in
fact, do more harm than  good.  Serious  consideration has to be given to
system reforms in the trade logistics sector.
*  *
*
109/  Many  foreign  ocean  carriers  are  interested  in  this  concept  as  they  have  iccounts  in  Indian
banks  in  the  Rupee  equivalent  of  millions US  Dollars  which  they  cannot  repatriate  because
of  exchange  controls.  They  would  favor  a  deal  between  the lines  and  the Government  which
would  enable  the  carriers  to  use  these funds  productively  through  purchase  of  equipment
-either  for own use  or for leasing-  to be  provided  for logistics  services.
2J0/  Several  European,  Japanese  and U.S.  carriers have  indicated  theilr  interest  in  operating
container  terminals  in  Madras and  Nhava Sheva.  They  would  also  be  willing to run
warehousing  complexes._  46 -
ANNEX
SOURCES OF INFORMATION
A. Trade and Industry Organizations
*  Federation of Indian Chambers cf Commerce and Industry
*  The Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry of India
*  Northern India Chamber of Commerce and Industry
*  Western India Chamber of Commerce and Industry
*  Southern India Chamber of Commerce and Industry
*  Bombay Chamber of Commerce and Industry
*  Punjab Chamber of Commerce and Industry
*  Members of the Indian Chapter of the International Chamber of
-ommerce
*  All India Shippers Council
*  Indian Merchants Chambers
*  Northern India Shippers Council
*  Western India Shippers Association
*  Southern India Shippers Association
*  Federation of Indian Exporters Organizations
*  All India Meat and Lifestock Exporters Association
*  Engineering Products Export Council
*  Handloom Products Export Council
B. Trading Houses
*  American Merchandise Corporation
*  Amersey
*  Benares  House
*  CNA  Group
*  Dotsal
*  Hindustanlever
*  Metro  Exports
*  Schokhi Industrials
*  Tata  Exports
*  Zodiac
C. Freight Handling Services
*  Federation of Freight Forwarders Associations of India
(FFFAI)
*  FFFAI members in  Bombay, Madras and New Delhi
*  All India Custom House Agents Association
*  Custom House Agents Associations  in Bombay, Madras and New
Delhi
*  Airfreight Clearing and Forwarding Agents in Bombay and New
Delhi
*  Foreign NVOCCs: Allcargoes Express, Javelin, and !-away- 47  -
D. Land Cargo  Transport  Services
*  All India Motor Transport Congress
*  Trucking companies in Bombay, Madras and New Delhi
*  Northern, Central and Western Railways
E.  Air  Cargo  Transport  Services
*  Air  India
*  Indian  Airlines
*  Continental Carriers
*  Lufthansa
F.  Seatrade  Services
INDIAN CARRIERS
*  Chowgule Steamships
*  Great Eastern Shipping Corporation
*  India Steamship Corporation
*  Shipping  Corporation  of India
*  The Scindia Steam Navigation Corporation
U.S. CARRIERS
*  American President Lines
*  Lykes  Lines
*  Sea-Land Corporation
*  Waterman-Isthmian  Steamship Corporation
EUROPEAN CARRIERS
*  Hapag-Lloyd
*  Hoegh  Lines
*  Maersk  Line
*  NedLloyd
*  P&OCL
ASIAN CARRIERS
*  Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd.  ('K'  Line)
*  Neptune Orient Lines
*  YangMing Marine Transport Corporation
FEEDER SERVICES
*  Regional Container Lines
*  Bengal  Tiger  Line- 48  -
G.  Transport Agents
*  Forbes, Forbes, Campbell & Co
*  Patel  Volkart
*  Shaw  Wallace
*  Volkart  Fleming
*  United Liner Agencies
*  Worldwide Cargo Care
H.  Maritime Transport Industry Organizations
*  Indian National Shipowners Association
*  Indian Register of Shipping
*  Bombay Steamers Association
*  Madras Steamship Association
I.  Port Organizations
*  Indian Ports Association
*  Bombay  Port  Trust
*  Madras Port Trust
*  Nhava Sheva Port Trust
J.  Maritime Training Institutions
*  Maritime Training Institute Bombay
*  National Institute for Port Management Madras
K.  Container Management Agencies
*  Container Corporation of India
*  Inland Container Depot New Delhi
*  Central Warehousing Corporation
*  Sealord Containers Ltd.
*  Lemuir Containers
L.  Organizations involved in Cargo Documentation and Insurance
*  Reserve Bank of India
*  Foreign Exchange Dealers Association of India
*  General Insurance Corporation of India
*  United India Insurance Corporation- 49  -
M.  Banking Services
*  Indian  Bank
*  The Shipping Credit and Investment Company of India
N.  Central Government Institutions
*  Ministry of Commerce
*  Ministry of Railways
*  Ministry of Surface Transport
*  Indian Institute of Foreign Trade
*  Central Board of Excise and Customs
*  Directorate of Customs Madras
0.  Consultants
*  International Information Systems (working on trade and
transport related software development)
*  A.F. Ferguson & Co  (working on transport issues in export
trades)
*  RITES (working on container management aspects)
*  TECNECON  (working on national ports and coastal shipping
studies)
P.  Action Committees
*  Pradhan Committee on Coastal Shipping
*  Rajwar Committee on Indian Shipping
*  Srinivasan Committee on Trade Document Simplification
*  Major Ports Reform Committee